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Certain legal concepts display a remarkable capacity to endure,
retaining utility and vitality notwithstanding fundamental social and
political change. Among these, the attorney-client privilege' has not
only survived major social, political, and ideological change,2 but also
has transcended its historical role as a narrowly drawn testimonial priv-
ilege applicable only to judicial and administrative proceedings.3 The
* B.A., 1969; M.A., 1971; M. Phil., 1978, Columbia University; J.D., 1974, North-
western University. Member, New York Bar.
1. The most commonly cited judicial statement of the elements of the attorney-client
privilege was made by Judge Wyzanski in United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F.
Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950): "The privilege applies only if(l) the asserted holder of the
privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to whom the communication was
made (a) is a member of the bar of a court, or his subordinate and (b) in connection with this
communication is acting as a lawyer, (3) the communication relates to a fact of which the
attorney was informed (a) by his client (b) without the presence of strangers (c) for the
purpose of securing primarily either (i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or
(iii) assistance in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of committing a crime
or tort; and (4) the privilege has been (a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client."
Another classic statement of the privilege was posed by Professor Wigmore: "(1) Where
legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as
such, (3) the communications relating to that purpose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the
client, (6) are at his instance permanently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the
legal adviser, (8) except the protection be waived." 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2292, at 554
(McNaughton rev. ed. 1961) [hereinafter cited as WIGMORE].
2. The attorney-client privilege has its roots in Roman Law. 8 WiGMoRE, supra note
1, § 2290; Burke, The Duty of Cond~entiality and.Disclosing Corporate Misconduct, 36 Bus.
LAW. 239, 242 (1981).
3. See, ng., Burke, The Duty of Confidentlity and Disclosing Corporate Misconduct,
36 Bus. LAW. 239, 241 (1981) ("[c]lient confidentiality has long been judged essential to the
prominence and visibility of the privilege in American jurisprudence
today can be attributed to its ability to encompass several of the essen-
tial threads that structure the American legal process.
The privilege originally was conceived to safeguard the "oath and
the honor of the attorney' 4 in a society predicated on the inequality of
rank.5 By the eighteenth century, however, the protection of the privi-
lege began to shift from the attorney to the client.6 Not surprisingly,
this shift corresponded to the formation and propagation of the ideol-
ogy of individualism-an ideology that emerged principally from the
political philosophy of John Locke and the economic theory of Adam
Smith. Individualism rejects the hierarchical society in favor of an at-
omistic society in which the individual is the ultimate subject of moral
predication. 7 More recently, the attorney-client privilege has been used
to provide some protection to the public corporation, an artificial entity
that fits uneasily within the framework of individualism.
8
A fundamental characteristic of the American legal system, em-
bodied in the attorney-client privilege, is the tension between the rights
of the individual and the good of society. The adversary system of jus-
tice is commited to individual rights and fair procedures, on the one
hand, and to discovery of the truth, on the other.9
Another important tension reflected in the privilege is generated
by attempts to treat, by analogy, the corporation as an individual. This
tension underlies much of the vexing search in recent years for a satis-
factory test to determine the proper scope of the attorney-client privi-
proper functioning of the adversary system"); Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality and the Adver-
sary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REV. 653, 667 (client would feel betrayed if lawyer
disclosed his confidences); Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy: Procedural Justice and Profes-
sional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L. REv. 29, 30-31 [hereinafter cited as Simon] (one of the most
elaborate expressions of the "Ideology of Advocacy" occurs in the attorney-client privilege);
Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing and Constitutional Entitlement,
91 HARv. L. REv. 464, 465 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Attorney-Client Privilege] (originally,
in Anglo-American jurisprudence, the attorney-client privilege "announced a broad value of
high-mindedness and honor ostensibly inherent in the business of lawyering").
4. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290, at 543.
5. Under the privilege in its original form, the client was not exempt from testifying
concerning his or her communications with an attorney. 8 WiGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290,
at 544.
6. Id. at 543.
7. See G. LODGE, THE NEW AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 9-10, 74 (1979).
8. The attorney-client privilege has been recognized as extending to corporations for
more than 100 years. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319
(7th Cir. 1963).
9. See G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 120-35 (1978) [hereinafter cited
as HAZARD]; Lawry, Lying, Confidentiality and the Adversary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH
L. REv. 653, 691; Simon, supra note 3, at 34-39.
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lege. 10 Notwithstanding the recent decision by the United States
Supreme Court in Upjohn Co. v. United States," the full scope of the
attorney-client privilege, as applied to corporations, is still in doubt.'
2
Instead of finally determining which corporate communications merit
the protections of the privilege, the Supreme Court plainly limited its
decision to the particular context in which the question arose.' 3 The
great caution with which the Supreme Court proceeded in Upjohn re-
flects a lack of general consensus concerning the proper parameters of
the attorney-client privilege as applied to corporations.
Finally, another tension reflected in the attorney-client privilege is
that caused by the conflict between the individual's right of privacy and
mandatory public disclosures required of corporations by federal secur-
ities laws. 14 This conflict has been exacerbated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission's (SEC) publicized efforts to enlist the securities
bar's assistance in policing the performance of their clients' public dis-
closure obligations.'
5
These three tensions spring from adherence to the ideology of in-
dividualism. The conflict between rights and consequences, between
individual rights and the good of society, is exemplified in the tension
between individual rights and the search for the truth, which character-
izes the adversary system.16 The conflict created by efforts to circum-
10. See notes 115-47 & accompanying text infra.
11. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
12. See SEC v. Gulf& Western Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 681 (D.D.C. 1981) (Upjohn
"did not articulate or provide more specific guidelines regarding corporations and the [attor-
ney-client] privilege as some had anticipated").
13. 449 U.S. at 396.
14. See Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976 & Supp. I 1979); Securi-
ties and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976 & Supp. III 1979). The SEC
disclosure rules generally limit a corporation's disclosure obligation to information that is
"material." See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.405(1), 230.408, 240.12b-2(j), 240.12b-20, 240.14a-1 to -9
(1981). Material facts are those which are important to a reasonable investor. See TSC
Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 445-49 (1976).
15. The SEC's campaign to enlist the securities bar to aid in the enforcement of the
securities laws was launched with its complaint in SEC v. National Student Marketing
Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3,
1972). Among other things, the SEC alleged that counsel aided and abetted violations of the
securities laws because they "failed to insist that the financial statements be revised and
shareholders be resolicited, and failing that, to cease representing their respective clients
and, under the circumstances, notify the plaintiff Commission concerning the misleading
nature of the. . . financial statements." Id. at 91,913-17. Recently, the SEC retreated from
its view of what constitutes aiding and abetting by attorneys, but gave no indication that it
was changing its position concerning the attorney's duty to disclose his or her client's wrong-
doings to a third party or to the public. In re Carter, Exchange Act Release No. 17,597 [1981
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 82,847 (Feb. 28, 1981).
16. See generaly Rosenfeld, Between Ri'hts and Consequences: .4 Philosophical Inquiry
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scribe the proper scope of the attorney-client privilege in the context of
corporations illustrates the problems encountered in attempting to fit
the corporation into the ideology of individualism.' 7 This tension in-
heres in attempts to extend individualism to corporations. Finally, the
tension brought about by the imposition of mandatory disclosure re-
quirements exemplifies the evolution of individualism from negative to
positive rights and duties. 18
In its original formulation, individualism posited that each indi-
vidual was thought capable of self-sufficiency. Accordingly, it empha-
sized negative rights for the individual-the right to be left alone to
pursue one's self-interests. More recently, the preservation of individu-
alism has been thought to be best effectuated by providing individuals
with an ever greater number of positive rights or entitlements.' 9 A co-
rollary to this evolution from negative to positive rights is the evolution
from negative duties to positive duties.20 The affirmative duty of
disclosure propounded by the SEC exemplifies this trend towards posi-
tive duties, with the corresponding positive right of the public to
information.
These changes within the theory of individualism, and the imposi-
tion on public corporations of disclosure requirements, have created
confusion regarding the scope of the attorney-client privilege as applied
to corporations. Solutions in this area appear elusive, at least in part
because the problems have not been comprehensively and exhaustively
articulated. To contribute to the understanding of these problems, this
Article places them within the broader theoretical context of the ideol-
ogy of individualism, which has given the attorney-client privilege its
modern day justifications. Accordingly, the attorney-client privilege is
analyzed in terms of the three crucial aspects of individualism men-
tioned above: the dichotomy between individual rights and social wel-
into the Foundations of Legal Ethics in the Changing World of Securities Regulation, 49 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 462 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Rosenfeld].
17. See Simon, The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 YALE L.J.
953, 990 (1956).
18. See text accompanying notes 211-23 infra.
19. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 494, 501.
20. "A positive right is a right to something; a negative right is a right not to be sub-
jected to certain actions. A positive right in one individual entails for another a positive
duty-a duty to do something; a negative right entails a negative duty-a duty to refrain
from doing something. Positive rights are asserted necessarily with respect to scarce goods.
Negative rights represent what may not be taken from one and given to another." Rosen-
feld, supra note 16, at 481 (footnotes omitted); cf. Rosenfeld, The Jurisprudence of Fairness:
Freedom Through Regulation in the Marketplace of Ideas, 44 FoRDHAm L. REv. 877, 879-82
(1976) (discussion of the parallel distinction between positive and negative freedom).
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fare; the extension of individualism to include corporations; and the
evolution from negative rights and duties to positive rights and duties.
The Article ultimately considers whether the protection afforded
by the attorney-client privilege can survive the advent of the public
corporation and the imposition upon it of the positive duties mandated
by the federal securities laws. In a formal sense, the privilege has en-
dured, and recent developments appear to ensure its continued sur-
vival. The question, however, is whether it has survived in substance,
or whether it has merely survived in form.
The Tension of Rights and Consequences in
the Adversary System
Unlike political ideologies that subordinate the aims of the indi-
vidual to those of society, the theory of individualism holds that the
individual has certain inalienable rights that cannot be suppressed in
the name of the common good.21 Accordingly, for an action to be mor-
ally justified within the context of individualism, it must promote a bal-
ance between the rights of the individual and the good of society; the
institutions of an individualist society must promote the common good
while simultaneously permitting the exercise of fundamental individual
rights.22
The adversary system of adjudication appears to satisfy this dual
requirement of individualism. While the aim of the adversary system is
to arrive at the truth,23 the means it employs are designed to promote
individual autonomy and to maximize individual control over the gath-
ering and presentation of evidence. 24 It allows each litigant to shape
and control the presentation of his or her case, either directly or
through an advocate,25 subject to the advocate's ethical duty to impose
certain limits on the client's choices.26
The rights protected by the attorney-client privilege, however, ap-
pear to conflict directly with the adversary system's goal of discovering
truth.27 Unimpeded access to an adversary's evidence increases the
available amount of evidence, improving the search for the truth; there-
21. L. DUMONT, FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARX 4 (1977).
22. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 472.
23. Discovery of the truth is a fundamental purpose of the adversary system. See, e.g.,
United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 626 (1980); Tehon v. Shott, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966).
24. See M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 14 (1975).
25. See HAZARD, supra note 9, at 120-21.
26. See Thornton v. United States, 357 A.2d 429 (D.C. 1976).
27. See 8 WIGMORE, sufpra note 1, § 2291, at 554. Jeremy Bentham attacked the privi-
lege on the grounds that its principal virtue is to aid criminals in concealing their crimes. J.
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fore, the operation of any testimonial privilege, shielding some commu-
nications from evidentiary admissibility, appears to hamper this
pursuit. Emphasis on the social consequences of the implementation of
the adversary system--determination of the truth-can lead to disre-
gard of individual rights. Conversely, primary preoccupation with
such rights could require some willingness to compromise the system's
truth-seeking purpose.
The attorney-client privilege encourages the expression of the cli-
ent's autonomy while shielding his or her right to privacy2 8 by protect-
ing confidential attorney-client communications from coerced
disclosure.2 9 To facilitate the proper functioning of the adversary sys-
tem, the attorney-client privilege must strike a delicate balance, pro-
tecting the client's privacy and autonomy while not unduly hindering
the search for the truth.30 If the privilege's protection is too broad, the
search for the truth will be compromised; if too narrow, individual
rights will be abridged.
The conflict between rights and consequences is a central problem
of those moral philosophies that adhere to the vision of individualism.
Although complete disregard of either rights or consequences would
lead to the collapse of individualism, 31 the two principal theoretical so-
lutions offered by moral philosophy rely exclusively on one of the terms
of the conflict to confer moral worth, but assume that the demands of
the other term nevertheless will be fulfilled. 32 For example, the "theory
of rights," which asserts that rights are prior to the good, determines the
moral worth of an action solely according to whether it gives expression
BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE SPECIALLY APPLIED TO ENGLISH PRACTICE
(1827), quoted in 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 549-51.
28. Some courts have viewed the attorney-client privilege as protecting the individual's
right to privacy. See, e.g., United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979),
rev'd, 449 U.S. 383 (1981); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 207 F. Supp. 771
(N.D. Ill. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963). See generally Louisell, Confidentiality,
Conforming and Confusion: Privileges in Federal Court Today, 31 TUL. L. REv. 101, 110- 11
(1956) (privileges "are a right to be let alone, a right to unfettered freedom, in certain nar-
rowly prescribed relationships, from the state's coercive or supervisory powers"); Attorney-
Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 483.
29. Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 464.
30. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 554.
31. Exclusive reliance on rights without any regard for end-results would lead to the
collapse of individualism by failing to guarantee to each individual the basic sustenance
without which he or she could not survive. Conversely, exclusive dedication to the produc-
tion of certain end-results might lead to the distribution of the greatest possible number of
goods for the greatest number of people, but would fail to safeguard any individual right,
thus ultimately leading to the destruction of the individual's integrity as the subject of moral
predication. Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 532-33.
32. Id. at 533.
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to rights.33 Adherents of this theory have implicitly assumed that the
unfettered exercise of individual rights also leads to the realization of
the common good.34 On the other hand, under the theory of utilitari-
anism, the moral worth of an action is derived exclusively from its con-
sequences.3 5 Its foremost adherents, however, have emphasized that
the protection of individual rights is one of the paramount goods that a
utilitarian society ought to pursue.
36
These competing theories provide two useful analogies to rights
and consequences in the adversary system. First, both the theory of
rights and utilitarianism reconcile individual rights and the good of so-
ciety, at least in theory.37 Arguably, the attorney-client privilege not
only protects the client's individual rights, but also promotes the dis-
covery of the truth.38 Second, if the theory of rights and utilitarianism
fail to reconcile individual rights and the good of society, they lose their
claim to legitimacy in the context of individualism. 39 Similarly, if the
adversary system is not perceived as conducive to the discovery of the
truth, the legitimacy of the attorney-client privilege should become in-
creasingly difficult to justify.
The theory of rights offers a better reconciliation than does utilita-
rianism of rights and consequences in the adversary system.40 This rec-
onciliation underlies the claim that the adversary system promotes
discovery of the truth while protecting individual rights. This claim is
33. Id. at 534.
34. Thus, for instance, Locke believed that private appropriation actually increases the
amount that is left for others. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSES-
SIVE INDIVIDUALISM 212 (1975). Similarly, Adam Smith said, "By pursuing his own interest
[the individual] frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really
intends to promote it." I A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (Oxford Univ. Press 1976).
35. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 1-7 (1948); J.S. MILL, Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, ESSAY
ON BENTHAM 257, 270-71 (M. Warnock ed. 1962).
36. See, e.g., J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, ESSAY ON BEN-
THAM 135 (M. Warnock ed. 1962): "[The only part of the conduct of any one, for which he
is amenable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part which merely concerns
himself, his independence is, of right, absolute. Over himself, over his own body and mind,
the individual is sovereign."
37. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 532-34.
38. See notes 50-57 & accompanying text infra.
39. See note 31 supra.
40. Because of its economy of means and ease of implementation, a theory of rights
based primarily on the grant of negative rights is virtually self-regulating. Utilitarian vi-
sions, on the other hand, require a definition of the common good and a repeated weighing
of utilities to derive the moral consequences of individual acts. See Rosenfeld, supra note
16, at 479.
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explicated by a brief review of the elements that frame the theory of
rights. These elements are drawn principally from the political philos-
ophy of John Locke and the economic theory of Adam Smith.
The Theory of Rights
Essentially, the vision of individualism that emerges from Locke
and Smith rests on two pillars: the autonomous individual who is free
to pursue self-interest, and a self-regulating system of economic compe-
tition that functions as an "invisible hand," transforming competing
individual interests into the common good.4 1 Underscoring his belief
in the autonomy of the individual, Locke rejected the notion that one
person could be subordinated to another: "[E]very man is naturally the
sole proprietor of his own person and capacities-the absolute proprie-
tor in the sense that he owes nothing to society for them."
42
This view of individualism contains two features that are particu-
larly noteworthy. The first is directly derived from Locke's concept of
property. In its usual sense, "property" is limited to such things as real
estate, and tangible and intangible goods. As Locke used the term,
however, it also extends to life, liberty, human capacities, and labor.
43
In accordance with this broad view of property, freedom consists not in
acting without restraints, but in the unfettered exercise of power and
control over one's property." Under this view, all individual rights can
be included within a single right, the right of each individual to enjoy
his or her property without interference. Similarly, all individual du-
ties can be subsumed under the single duty not to interfere with the
right of other individuals to exercise unfettered control over their prop-
erty. Thus, the grant of a single negative right and the imposition of a
single negative duty on each individual establish a social order in
which each individual can enjoy the maximum autonomy compatible
with the maintenance of public order. Finally, this broad concept of
property also encompasses an individual's thoughts, recollections, sen-
41. See id. at 468-75.
42. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM 231
(1975).
43. "Man ... hath by nature a power ... to preserve his property, that is, his life,
liberty and estate." J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT § 87 (rev. ed. 1963).
In other words, property is that "which men have in their persons, as well as goods." Id.
§ 173.
44. "Freedom is not, as we are told, 'a liberty for every man to do what he lists.' (For
who could be free, when every other man's humour might domineer over him?) But a Lib-
erty to dispose, and order, as he lists, his person, actions, possessions and his whole property
.... , d. §57.
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timents, and information. 45 Therefore, these also are afforded full pro-
tection under the individual's right to his or her property.
The second salient feature of this view of individualism concerns
the self-regulating mechanism of competition. This mechanism func-
tions not, strictly speaking, because of each individual's pursuit of self-
interest. Instead, the clash of individual self-interests brings about the
common good.46 If the individual were to pursue the common good
instead of self-interests, on the other hand, such philanthropy would
interfere with the self-regulating market mechanism enunciated by
Adam Smith.47 Consequently, if individuals abandon the vigorous
pursuit of their self-interest, the clash loses its vitality, and the market
forces lose their ability to regulate for the common good. Under this
theory, individuals promote social welfare by pursuing their self-inter-
est in the economic market place.48 Although a moral duty to do what
is in one's interest may appear paradoxical, the alternative-doing
what one perceives as being in the common good-would frustrate the
common good in this context. Ultimately, the realization of the com-
mon good is attributable to impersonal market forces, rather than to
the volitional acts of the individual participants in the marketplace. If,
because circumstances change, these impersonal forces no longer pro-
mote the realization of the common good, the justification for allowing
each individual to engage in the unfettered pursuit of self-interest
would disappear.49 The individual's pursuit of self-interest would then
lose its legitimacy.
These principles of individualism, derived from Locke and Smith,
underlie the argument that the adversary system promotes a reconcilia-
tion between the protection of individual rights and the search for the
truth,50 an argument implicitly embracing the proposition that the at-
45. Id. § 173.
46. See R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 53 (5th ed. 1980).
47. "By pursuing his own interest [the individual] frequently promotes that of the soci-
ety more effectually than when he really intends to promote it. I have never known much
good done by those who affected to trade for the public good." 1 A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (Oxford Univ. Press
1976).
48. For Smith, although the general sphere of morality is based on sympathy, economic
activity not only is, but also ought to be, exclusively guided by self-love. See L. DUMONT,
FROM MANDEVILLE TO MARx 61-62 (1977).
49. Cf. R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 67-68 (5th ed. 1980) (the great-
est enemy of Adam Smith's market society is the unopposed self-interest of the monopolist).
50. "The adversary system in law administration bears a striking resemblance to the
competitive economic system. In each we assume that the individual through partisanship
or through self-interest will strive mightily for his side, and that kind of striving we must
have." Cheatham, The Lawyer's Role and Surroundings, 25 ROCKY MTN. L. REv. 405, 410
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torney-client privilege ultimately contributes to the discovery of the
truth.5 1 Thus, the adversary system, or the "Adam Smith system" of
adjudication, 52 ideally should distill the truth from opposing factual
presentations and arguments advanced by the parties invoking its
processes.
The adversary system is structured like the economic world of
Adam Smith;53 whether the systemfunctions analogously is not clear.
Individual litigants, each pursuing his or her self-interest before a dis-
interested judge or jury who plays a role akin to Adam Smith's "invisi-
ble hand," present a picture of open competition in what may be
characterized as a "marketplace of ideas." 54  That such biased
presentations of fact and theory should be conducive to the truth, how-
ever, is largely a matter of conjecture. Nevertheless, it has been con-
tended that adjudication under the adversary system leads to discovery
of the truth because it depends on the interplay between two distinct
components. First, "party presentation will result in the best presenta-
tion, because each party is propelled into maximum effort in investiga-
tion and presentation by the prospect of victory. . . .-5 In contrast, a
disinterested party, such as a judge, is motivated only by a sense of
honor or commitment to duty.56
The second element of the argument in favor of the adversary sys-
tem assumes a certain method of factfinding based on the use of
evidence.
[P]roof through evidence requires hypothesis; hypothesis requires a
preliminary mind set; if an active judge-interrogator develops the
proof, his preliminary mindset too easily can become his final deci-
sion; therefore, it is better to have conflicting preliminary hypotheses
and supporting proofs presented by the parties so that judge's mind
can be kept open until all the evidence is at hand.
5 7
According to this argument, truth is revealed because the litigants are
motivated solely by the desire for victory, and the judge is required to
keep an open mind until the parties have completed their presentation.
Within this framework, the individual litigant's efforts to obtain a
(1953). But see Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN
RIGHTS 1 (1975).
51. See notes 55-57 & accompanying text infra.
52. Frankel, From Private Fights Towards Public Justice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 516, 535
(1976).
53. See note 50 supra.
54. HAZARD, supra note 9, at 122-23.





victory do not, in and of themselves, promote discovery of the truth.
Nevertheless, they are essential to the process of discovering the truth.
Such efforts are endowed with moral worth, both because they promote
the individual's right to autonomy and because they contribute to the
truth-seeking process.
To be meaningful, the individual litigant's right to seek victory
must entail both access to relevant information and the ability to pro-
tect the confidentiality of certain other information. Each litigant must
be given access to relevant evidence in the possession of the adversary,
but not the ability to discover information that ought to remain beyond
the grasp of an adversary.5 8 By combining the general individual right
to protect confidences, a negative right, with a right of discovery, a pos-
itive right, the litigant need only exercise these individual rights, and
can ignore the social consequences of the pursuit of judicial victory.
Ideally, an individualist society would have no need for attorneys
because each individual would possess the requisite capacity to ad-
vance and protect his or her legitimate self-interest. As society became
more complex, however, the individual could no longer efficiently ad-
vance self-interest without the aid of specialists. 59 One such specialist,
the attorney, is the individual's representative within the adversary sys-
tem. Moreover, with the advent of the corporation, the attorney's role
became significantly expanded. In addition to acting as a representa-
tive or "mouthpiece" for the client, the attorney became a close adviser,
consulted on a daily basis concerning the affairs of a corporate client.60
The need for attorneys, coupled with adherence to the individual-
ist vision, justify reliance on the attorney-client privilege. To preserve
the individual's rights under the adversary system in a society charac-
terized by increasing specialization and division of functions, uninhib-
ited consultations with attorneys must be allowed for the purpose of
obtaining legal advice and representation. 61
The attorney-client privilege must be precisely tailored to function
in harmony with the adversary system's pursuit of truth. If the privi-
58. Compare FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain discovery regarding any
matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion. . . . It is not ground for objection that the information sought will be inadmissible at
the trial if the information sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence.") with Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976) (assuring confi-
dentiality promotes open discussion between attorney and client).
59. See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291, at 545-46.
60. See Forrow, The Corporate Law.Department Lawyer: Counselto the Entity, 34 Bus.
LAW. 1797, 1829 (1979).
61. See 8 WIGMoRE, supra note I, § 2291, at 545-46.
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lege is overbroad, reliance on lawyers for legal advice and representa-
tion would enhance the opportunity to conceal information from an
adversary; a too narrow privilege would afford the adversary access to
information that would not otherwise be discoverable. Accordingly,
the attorney-client privilege should protect information communicated
by a client to the lawyer in connection with the latter's rendition of
legal services, but should not provide a shield against discovery of in-
formation relating to the subject-matter of the dispute between the
parties.
The attorney-client privilege permits the accomplishment of these
objectives by granting protection to confidential attorney-client com-
munications made in the course of seeking or receiving legal advice. 62
By protecting communications but not information, the privilege does
not permit a client to use the attorney relationship to shield otherwise
discoverable information. 63 By protecting communications, however,
the privilege shields from discovery information that is generated
exclusively in the course of confidential attorney-client com-
munications. 64
Alternatives to the Theory of Rights
As long as the analogy to the world of Adam Smith is tenable, the
components of the adversary system hold together: individual rights
and society's need for the truth are achieved concurrently, and the cli-
ent and attorney may pursue the client's self-interests and simultane-
ously satisfy their moral obligation. 65 If this analogy is fallacious,
however, the protection of individual rights and the search for the truth
are antagonistic goals that throw into question the legitimacy of the
adversary system.66 Nevertheless, even if the conflict between the indi-
vidual's right to pursue self-interest and society's right to pursue the
common good cannot be completely resolved, compromises may be ca-
pable of reducing the conflict sufficiently to preserve the adversary sys-
tem as a workable, if imperfect, means of adjudication.
62. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 952 (West 1966).
63. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981); City of Philadelphia v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 205 F. Supp. 830, 831 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
64. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 396 (1981).
65. See notes 50-64 & accompanying text supra.
66. Cf. American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 87 (D. Del.
1962) (policy considerations of the attorney-client privilege clash with the broad scope of
discovery under Federal Rules); Commercio E Industria Continental, S.A. v. Dresser Indus.,
19 F.R.D. 513, 514 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (conflict exists when request for discovery is opposed by
claim of attorney-client privilege).
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Such compromises essentially take two forms. The first compro-
mise, based on utilitarianism, recognizes the antagonism between indi-
vidual and social goals, but maintains that if properly balanced the
adversary system, and especially the attorney-client privilege, can func-
tion for the greater good of society. 67 The second compromise does not
recognize the possibility of achieving a workable reconciliation be-
tween individual rights and social goals, but maintains that the adver-
sary system should be preserved to safeguard the integrity of one or the
other of these two. Depending on which of the two it seeks to promote,
it will either embrace or reject the attorney-client privilege.
68
The Utilitarian Justqfcation
Underlying the utilitarian view is a rejection of the proposition
that individuals' pursuit of self-interest will necessarily bring about the
realization of the common good.69 To a utilitarian, the ultimate ethical
question is not whether an action is right, but whether its consequences
are good.70 Moreover, because utilitarianism embraces the basic tenets
of individualism, 7' its conception of good is predicated on what is good
for individuals qua individuals rather than on what may be good for
society at large. Utilitarianism's overriding moral principle, the utility
principle, therefore holds that the good consists of the promotion of the
greatest happiness of the greatest number.72 Accordingly, to a utilita-
rian, an action is good, and therefore right, if its consequence is to
bring greater happiness to a greater number of individuals.
The foremost proponent of a utilitarian justification for the attor-
ney-client privilege was Professor Wigmore. He contended that, al-
though promotion of the individual's interest in confidentiality is at
odds with the adversary system's goal of discovering the truth, the utl-
ity principle is best satisfied by a balance; a privilege protecting rele-
vant communications can be justified only if "[tihe injury that would
inure to the relation by the disclosure of [the communication would] be
greater than the benet thereby gained for the correct disposal of litiga-
67. See notes 69-77 & accompanying text infra.
68. See notes 78-85 & accompanying text infra.
69. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 475-79.
70. See note 35 & accompanying text supra. See generally Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at
476-77.
71. See 8 F. COPLESTON, A HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 3 (1966).
72. See, e.g., J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION 1-7 (1948); J.S. MILL, Uilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, ESSAY
ON BENTHAM 257 (M. Wamock ed. 1962).
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tion." 73 Thus, the privilege must give way to the pursuit of truth when
society's need exceeds the injury to the client.
The most commonly cited justification for the application of the
attorney-client privilege is that it encourages full disclosure by the cli-
ent to the attorney.74  Uninhibited communication between attorney
and client is necessary to ensure that the client is aware of his or her
rights and potential claims 75 and to enable the attorney to make the
most effective presentation of these claims.
76
The failure to press just claims and the inability to make the most
effective presentation of asserted claims harm not only the client but
also society. If just claims remain unasserted, and if the merits of those
asserted are weakened by a client's withholding of information, the
very ends of justice are frustrated. Accordingly, utilitarian theory
could justify the preservation of the attorney-client privilege despite its
shortcomings. Although the privilege has the harmful consequence of
the concealment of otherwise relevant information, this consequence is
outweighed by the benefits of the assertion of a greater number of just
claims and the more effective presentation made possible by uninhib-
ited attorney-client consultations.7
7
73. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2285, at 527 (emphasis in original).
74. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981); Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 403 (1976); Hunt v.
Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888).
75. Cf. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 322 (7th Cir. 1963):
"[T]here has been general agreement that the purpose of the privilege is to facilitate the
administration of justice by encouraging full disclosure by the client to its attorney."
76. See American Cyanamid Co. v. Hercules Powder Co., 211 F. Supp. 85, 88 n.12 (D.
Del. 1962): "[T]he basis for the privilege is the importance of increasing the effectiveness of
attorneys .... "
77. Arguably, the attorney-client privilege promotes a number of other social values.
The benefits to individual rights alone may justify application of the privilege; the individ-
ual's alienation from the legal system that would result from repudiation of the privilege
may alone outweigh any benefit gained thereby. Considerations of efficiency in the per-
formance of attorneys within the adversary system might also justify preservation of the
privilege.
The elasticity of the utility principle stems from the fact that there can be as many
different utilitarian moral visions as there are conceptions of the common good. See Rosen-
feld, supra note 16, at 483. Some utilitarian theories have been called "positive" because
they actively endeavor to promote the welfare of all. Others have been described as being
"negative" because they are content with minimizing evil. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG
199 (1978).
Whether any single one of these benefits is included in the benefit side of the utilitarian
equation may be of no significant importance to an individual. Deciding which values are
included, and which are excluded, however, may be crucial in determining whether utilitari-
anism can justify applying the attorney-client privilege to corporations. Arguably, the prin-
ciple of utility does not require extending some of the benefits mentioned above to
corporations; the utilitarian justification for the privilege in the case of the individual does
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Justfcations of the Adversary System that Ignore Either Rights or
Consequences
Two justifications for the adversary system do not admit the possi-
bility of a reconciliation between the objectives of the individual and of
society. The first justification is a variation on the theory of rights al-
ready described: 73 basic individual rights must be protected even if
such protection does not promote the common good.7 9 This view does
not depend on a belief that the adversary system of justice is more con-
ducive to discovering the truth than is any other system; the adversary
system and the attorney-client privilege should be preserved because
they protect individual autonomy, dignity, and privacy.80
Under this first justification, even if the adversary system of justice
is rejected because it is less likely than another system to yield the truth,
preservation of the attorney-client privilege might still be justified. For
example, in a c6mplex social setting, the individual tends to become
increasingly alienated from the legal process. 8' The benefit of having a
"friend" familiar with the legal system should mitigate the individual's
alienation. As a "legal friend," the attorney could offer the client sup-
port in the face of an unfamiliar process while pursuing the client's
not necessarily entail a corresponding justification in the case of the corporation. Thus, for
instance, a lack of privilege presumably would not have as chilling an effect on corporate
clients as it would on individual clients. Indeed, unlike the latter, the former are in constant
need of legal advice. See J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 503(b)
[04], at 503-58 (1980); see also In re Transocean Tender Offer Securities Litigation, 78
F.R.D. 692, 697 n.7 (N.D. IlM 1978).
78. See notes 41-64 & accompanying text supra.
79. This position roughly corresponds to the view elaborated in R. NOZICK, ANARCHY,
STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
80. See note 28 supra. Arguably, although the outcome of a trial may be arbitrary, it is
fair because it is solely the result of the efforts of individual litigants, regulated by the impar-
tial implementation of neutral rules and procedures. See Simon, supra note 3, at 104: "The
game is a social phenomenon in which the satisfactory quality of the outcome depends al-
most entirely on the proper implementation of procedures. People usually feel that when
the rules are followed the outcome of a game is just, precisely because the rules have been
followed .... It should not therefore be surprising that some philosophers find the game
the most satisfying example of procedural justice."
The attorney-client privilege is necessary to allow each litigant and his or her attorney
to develop courtroom strategy without fear that it will be discovered by the adversary. Ar-
guably, in this particular context, the attorney-client privilege would be superfluous in view
of the protections afforded by the work product doctrine, which protects from discovery
materials prepared in anticipation of litigation by a party, his or her attorney, or other
agents. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). Unlike the
attorney-client privilege, however, the work product doctrine affords only a qualified immu-
nity from discovery. See Goosman v. A. Dule Pyle, Inc., 320 F.2d 45, 52 (4th Cir. 1962).
81. See Simon, supra note 3, at 141: "The very existence of the occupation of the advo-
cate pre-supposes some measure of alienation from law."
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legal goals.82 To establish such trust, the lawyer must be able to war-
rant that he or she will not betray the client's confidences. The attor-
ney-client privilege provides this guarantee.
The second justification for the adversary system that does not rec-
oncile the objectives of the individual and of society is derived from a
variant of the utilitarian view, the broader theory of consequential-
ism.8 3 This argument maintains that the adversary system of justice is
able to promote the discovery of the truth, but is prevented from doing
so because individual litigants can conceal relevant information by the
use of devices such as the attorney-client privilege.84 Therefore, if the
attorney-client privilege and other available truth-concealing devices
were abandoned, the adversary system would more effectively operate
for the common good.85
Constitutional Dimensions of the Privilege
Unqualified adoption of this last view, however, is foreclosed
under American jurisprudence because it would violate certain consti-
tutional rights of the individual. The fifth amendment to the United
States Constitution forbids compelling individuals to testify against
themselves.8 6 Under the sixth amendment, criminal defendant has a
right to counsel.8 7 Furthermore, some courts have suggested that civil
litigants also have a constitutional right, implicitly derived from the
fifth amendment's due process clause, to retain hired counsel.8 8 Taken
together, these constitutional rights encompass the attorney-client priv-
82. See generally Fried, The Lawyer as Friend- The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-
Client Relation, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976).
83. Consequentialism is a moral theory that subordinates the right to the good and that
measures the moral worth of any action from an evaluation of its consequences. See C.
FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 7-9 (1978).
84. See notes 27, 66 supra.
85. The argument against this position is that elimination of the attorney-client privi-
lege will destroy clients' incentive to confide in their attorneys; the truth will not come out
and the attorneys' effectiveness will be greatly damaged.
86. See, e.g., Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); In re Grand Jury Proceed-
ings (Johanson), 632 F.2d 1033 (3d Cir. 1980). Corporations have no fifth amendment privi-
leges against self-incrimination. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906); In re Agan, 498 F.
Supp. 493, 494 (N.D. Ga. 1980) ("Corporations can only speak through their officers, and it
is now beyond dispute that a corporate officer may be compelled to produce corporate
records even though they may be personally incriminating.").
87. See, e.g., Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
88. Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118 (5th Cir. 1980). This right,
which does not require the government to provide lawyers for litigants in civil matters, also
extends to corporations. Id. at 1119.
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ilege.89 Moreover, without such a privilege, the individual's right
against self-incrimination could only be guaranteed by forgoing the
right to communicate with counsel, and the individual's right to coun-
sel and to retain counsel could not be exercised without risking a sur-
render of the right against self-incrimination.
Therefore, the attorney-client privilege is necessary if the right
against self-incrimination and the right to counsel are not to become
mutually exclusive. At a minimum, the privilege must protect confi-
dential communications between an individual and his or her attorney
that contain any incriminating information obtained from the client.
Thus, within the framework of individualism, the attorney-client
privilege can be justified under both the theory of rights and the theory
of utilitarianism. Moreover, in the context of American jurisprudence,
existence of the privilege is mandated by constitutional considerations
as a necessary bridge that spans the preservation of the individual's
right against self-incrimination and the right to counsel.
The origin of these constitutional rights can be traced ultimately to
a single source: the right to property as broadly conceived by Locke.90
These two constitutional rights, and the privilege that allows them to
coexist, are separate and partial expressions of what was originally en-
compassed within Locke's broad right to property. An understanding
of this theory aids in evaluating the legitimacy of extending the protec-
tion of the attorney-client privilege to corporations. 91
The central purpose of the fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination is to protect the individual's fundamental right to privacy:
the right to be left alone to experience personal beliefs, thoughts, emo-
tions, and sensations within an inviolate enclave.92 This right to pri-
vacy, based on Locke's definition of the right to property, has been
enunciated in case law. Almost one hundred years ago, in Boyd v.
United States,93 the Supreme Court held that a government prosecutor
was constitutionally barred under the fifth amendment from procuring
89. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 485-86; see also Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 396-97 (1976); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Johanson), 632 F.2d
1033, 1042 n.14 (3d Cir. 1980) ("[The] scope of the attorney-client privilege does. .. en-
velop the client's fifth amendment privilege to protect the client's right against self-
incrimination.").
90. See notes 43-44 & accompanying text supra.
91. See text accompanying notes 92-104 infra.
92. "Expressions are legion in opinions of this Court that the protection of personal
privacy is a central purpose of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination." Fisher v.
United States, 425 U.S. 391, 416 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring).
93. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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an individual's private papers. Underlying that holding was the prem-
ise that the individual's personality and the "privacies of life" must be
equated with an individual's property rights.94 Locke's broad right to
property encompassed the right to be left alone to enjoy one's posses-
sions, as well as one's personality, thoughts, emotions, and sensations.95
Therefore, the right to privacy is implicit in Locke's right to property.
96
Through the erosion of the Lockean absolute right to property and the
advent of technological changes, which made the prevention of unwar-
ranted intrusions into the "privacies of life" increasingly difficult, the
need arose for a right to privacy that would be separate and distinct
from the right to property.97 Thus, the right to privacy protects both
the core within which the enclave of inviolable individual rights cannot
shrink and the individual right to be free from certain technological
intrusions that traditional property law is powerless to prevent. 98
Just as technological progress necessitated an independent right to
privacy, the right to counsel became necessary when the system of laws
had become so complex that the individual lacked the requisite skills to
handle his or her legal affairs. 99 Presumably, in a Lockean state of na-
ture, or in a minimal state society, the individual could alone protect
his or her right to property. Increased size and power have made the
government more intrusive, and the individual has become increasingly
alienated from the legal process; the aid of a legal specialist is necessary
to preserve one's fundamental rights and to prevent unwarranted gov-
ernment intrusions. The attorney-client privilege, in turn, serves to
guarantee an individual's rights by securing a trusted advocate for
those rights. Historically, individual autonomy was preserved by the
negative right to be left alone. Increased government intrusion and the
proliferation of complex laws have necessitated the grant of a positive
right to the assistance of counsel to safeguard fundamental rights.
Ultimately, therefore, the loss of individual privacy and autonomy
94. See id. at 630.
95. See notes 43-44 & accompanying text supra.
96. See generally Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Pri-
vacy Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977).
97. See id. at 961 ("Since the formalist sphere of privacy depended largely on tradi-
tional property concepts for its definition, technological change and modem methods of
intruding on personal privacy, such as wiretapping, could present problems not readily an-
swered by reference to the old categories."); see also Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Pri-
vacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205 (1890) (right of privacy might be viewed as inhering in the
right to property, but more properly relates to the principle of inviolate personality).
98. See generally Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 193-
214 (1890).
99. See Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1118-19 (5th Cir. 1980).
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necessitates the grant of separate rights of privacy and against self-in-
crimination, as well as a right to the assistance of counsel. To the ex-
tent that it rests on constitutional considerations, therefore, the
attorney-client privilege is made necessary by the de facto diminution
of the individual's powers to secure privacy and autonomy.
The Corporate Attorney-Client Privilege: Attempts to Extend
Individualist Rights
Although corporations have no fifth amendment right against self-
incrimination, 100 they do not entirely lack a right of privacy' 0 1 and en-
joy the same constitutional right to the assistance of hired counsel as do
individuals.'0 2 Two major differences between corporations and indi-
viduals, however, inhibit extending the rights of an individual to corpo-
rations: (1) unlike individuals, corporations are abstract entities with
hierarchical structures;10 3 and (2) primarily because of the separation
between ownership and control,1°4 corporations do not function like
individuals in their relation to other individuals and to society at large.
Certain intracorporate relations have no equivalent in the realm of
the individual. Accordingly, the corporate structure poses numerous
problems to the extension of the attorney-client privilege to corpora-
tions: deciding who within the corporation is a proper spokesperson to
waive the privilege on its behalf, determining how far down the em-
ployee ranks attorney communications can be transmitted without de-
stroying the requisite confidentiality for the protection of the privilege,
and determining whether communications with former employees
come within the scope of the privilege. In addition, the size and struc-
ture of modern public corporations often require corporate counsel to
100. See note 86 supra.
101. Corporations have, for example, fourth amendment rights. See Hale v. Henkel,
201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906); Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 484.
102. See note 88 supra.
103. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSiBILrrY EC 5-18 (1979): "A lawyer
employed or retained by a corporation or similar entity owes his allegiance to the entity and
not to a stockholder, director, officer, employee, representative, or other person connected
with the entity."
104. "To Adam Smith and his followers, private property was a unity involving posses-
sion. He assumed that ownership and control were combined. Today, in the modem corpo-
ration, this unity has been broken. Passive Property,--specifically, shares of stock or
bonds,--gives its possessors an interest in an enterprise but gives them practically no control
over it, and involve [sic] no responsibility. Active Propery,-plant, good will, organization,
and so forth which make up the actual enterprise,--is controlled by individuals who, almost
invariably, have only minor ownership interest in it." A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MOD-
ERN CoRPoRAnoN AND PnivATE PROPERTY 304 (rev. ed. 1968) [hereinafter cited as BERLE
& MEANS].
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act as an investigator in addition to acting as an advocate and a legal
advisor. When the role of the attorney is primarily that of an investiga-
tor gathering information about the corporate client, it may be difficult
to determine whether the privilege applies. 105
Moreover, the separation of ownership and control poses an even
more fundamental problem regarding the legitimacy of extending the
attorney-client privilege to corporations. In the individualist paradigm,
as derived from Locke and Adam Smith, the individual was presumed
to be in full control of his or her property, and free, if not morally
obligated, to use that property to promote self-interests.10 6 In the cor-
porate setting, however, the interests of the individuals who are in con-
trol do not necessarily coincide with those of the corporation's owners,
its shareholders.
0 7
The split of the corporate atom into the two separate and distinct
spheres of ownership and control raises questions about the legitimacy
of the unfettered pursuit by the corporation of its own self-interests.
Corporate ownership and control have become increasingly independ-
ent of one another.10 8 Ownership of public corporations has become
substantially diluted, and individual shareholders have lost the ability
to exert significant influence on the conduct of corporate affairs. 10 9
Corporate management has become increasingly autonomous and ca-
pable of conducting the affairs of the corporation in substantial disre-
gard of the best interests of the shareholders. Thus, the corporate
vehicle might be used to frustrate the exercise by the individual share-
holders of their rights to control their property."10
Two roles for the corporation in the "marketplace of ideas" estab-
lished by the adversary system of justice seem possible. The split in the
105. See notes 151-88 & accompanying text infra.
106. See notes 41-48 & accompanying text supra.
107. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 492-93. Therefore, corporate management may be
incapable of pursuing their self-interests, causing an imperfection in the marketplace. See
generally 3 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 838
(rev. perm. ed. 1975) (directors and officers of a corporation have a fiduciary duty to stock-
holders, although the interests of the corporation may differ from those of the stockholder);
R. HEILBRONER, THE WORLDLY PHILOSOPHERS 69 (5th ed. 1980) (Adam Smith believed
self-interest was the key to a business' success and felt corporations were likely to fail be-
cause of lack of self-interest).
108. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 104, at 304.
109. See id.
110. Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 493. Thus, substantial restraints are often imposed on
corporate management. For example, officers and directors of a corporation are its fiduciary
agents, and as such they are prohibited from self-dealing and from appropriating corporate
opportunities to themselves. W. CARY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORI'ORATIONS 436-44
(5th ed. abr. 1980).
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corporate atom may be held to have a substantially similar impact on
both the economic arena and the marketplace of ideas. Conversely, it
can be thought not to have a significant effect on the integrity or legiti-
macy of the adversary system. In the first of these cases, the theory of
rights justification for the adversary system and for the attorney-client
privilege would seem simply to collapse in the context of corpora-
tions.'I' In the second of these cases, however, the theory of rights may
be thought to entitle corporate managers to pursue their own self-inter-
ests in court." 12 This pursuit, however, might lead to a conflict with
management's other duties towards the shareholders.
Even if attempts to find theory of rights justifications for the ad-
versary system and the attorney-client privilege were abandoned, con-
flict would not necessarily be avoided. Thus, for instance, permitting a
corporation to invoke the privilege to defeat a shareholder's attempt to
obtain discovery on the assumption that application of the attorney-
client privilege to corporations is fully justified on utilitarian grounds
would not avert such a conflict. Regardless of any contribution that it
might make to the efficacy of the adversary system, application of the
attorney-client privilege to shield evidence from the shareholder argua-
bly could always lead to a violation of the shareholder's fundamental
right to his or her property." 3
To compound these difficulties, the corporation can, as an adver-
sary, occupy a position that seems indistinguishable from that of an
individual."l 4 In such circumstances, the justifications advanced for the
I 1. If corporate management's pursuit of its self-interest lacks legitimacy, it cannot be
justified as a right. On the other hand, for corporate management to manage, it must do
more than merely mechanically implement the fully articulated self-interest of shareholders.
Accordingly, management's actions cannot exclusively rely on the implementation of the
rights of others. To some extent, at least, management must weigh the consequences of its
actions before it can serve the rights of ownership.
112. It is, of course, not logically inconsistent to maintain that, notwithstanding the split
in the corporate atom, the truth nevertheless continues to emerge from the clash of antago-
nistic positions. Presumably, the motivation of corporate management in a lawsuit against
the corporation's shareholders is no different from its motivation against any other
adversary.
113. Because of its capacity to weigh consequences, utilitarianism can be used to resolve
conflicts between incompatible rights. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 483. When two
conflicting rights operate in different domains, however, even utilitarianism may lack an
adequate basis of comparison. If both rights-the shareholder's property right and corpo-
rate management's right to confidentiality as an adversary-are equally fundamental within
their own domain, the only way for utilitarianism to resolve the conflict between them
would be to weigh the benefits of private ownership against those of the adversary system of
justice.
114. Although the corporation's boundaries are blurred, and its rights and duties within
the adjudicatory process may be in conflict with its rights and duties in the world at large,
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application of the attorney-client privilege to individuals appear to be
equally applicable without modification to corporations.
Problems Inherent in Corporate Structure
Corporate clients are artificial entities that communicate only
through agents. Their structure and organization require that responsi-
bilities and the information necessary to the fulfillment of such respon-
sibilities be delegated and compartmentalized.' 5 In contrast, an
individual client can provide information to the attorney, receive infor-
mation from the attorney, and decide what course of action to pursue
in light of the information received from the attorney.11 6 Accordingly,
extension of the attorney-client privilege to corporate clients raises dif-
ficult conceptual questions. Judicial recognition of the application of
the privilege to corporations, however, dates back for more than a cen-
tury, and this application remained beyond judicial challenge in this
country until the 1960's.117
The most controverted issue concerning the application of the at-
torney-client privilege to corporations during the past two decades was
not raised in older cases. Until 1962 there was no judicial inquiry into
who should be entitled to seek legal advice on the corporation's behalf.
Rather, older cases emphasized the unity of the corporation as a sepa-
rate entity opposed to the rest of the world, and assumed that anyone
within the corporation could engage in confidential communications
with its attorneys. 18
In 1962, however, two decisions raised substantial questions about
the application of individualism to corporations in the context of the
attorney-client privilege. In Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas As-
there are circumstances in which the corporation essentially behaves like an individual. For
example, in an adversary proceeding the corporation often confronts the government or an-
other entity, and the corporation's management and shareholders are often in full
agreement.
115. See Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege-Identfying The Corporate Client, 48
FORDHAM L. REV. 1281, 1289 (1980).
116. See Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 391 (1981).
117. See Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319-21 (7th Cir.
1963).
118. See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass.
1950) (privilege does not extend to communications made to corporation's attorney by some-
one outside the organization); see also Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121
F. Supp. 792, 795 (D. Del. 1954) ("strangers" whose communications are not entitled to the
privilege are "those not affiliated with the corporation as employees, officers, directors, or
'outside counsel' "). But see Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 508 (1947) (communication
between tug-owners' attorney and tug crewmembers falls outside attorney-client privilege).
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sociation,"9 a federal district court found the privilege inapplicable to
corporations because historically it had been personal in nature, and
was thus to be invoked only by natural persons.' 20 Additionally, the
court stated that the requisite element of confidentiality could not be
maintained in the corporate context because of the possibility of wide-
spread disclosure within the corporation.
12'
In City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,122 another
federal district court, while approving much of the logic and historical
analysis of Radiant Burners, held that the privilege was applicable to
corporations because it had gone unchallenged for so long. 123 The
court, however, rejected a broad extension of the privilege within the
corporation on the grounds that not all communications between cor-
porate employees and counsel can be deemed to be communications by
the corporation.124 Thus, if an employee communicating with the cor-
poration's attorney does not have the authority to seek legal advice on
behalf of the corporation, the employee is acting as a third party or a
mere witness, and the communication is outside the scope of the corpo-
ration's privilege. 25 For purposes of the attorney-client privilege,
therefore, a court must look behind the corporate entity to separate
those who can speak for the corporation from those who cannot.
In 1963, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision in
Radiant Burners. 26 Holding that the privilege applies to corpora-
tions, 127 the court attempted to circumscribe the limits of the corporate
attorney-client privilege to reflect accurately the complexity of the
modem corporation. Three issues defined the court's concern: (1) who
could speak for the corporation, (2) how to provide for the gathering
and dissemination of privileged information, and (3) whether and to
what extent the attorney-client privilege should protect management-
attorney communications from disclosure in shareholder litigation.
128
The first two issues primarily center on differences in structure between
the individual and the corporation, while the third focuses on differ-
119. 207 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. IMI. 1962), rev'd, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
120. 207 F. Supp. at 773.
121. Id. at 773-75.
122. 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
123. Id. at 484.
124. Id. at 485.
125. Id.
126. Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 319 (7th Cir. 1963).
127. "It is our considered judgment that based on history, principle, precedent and pub-
lic policy the attorney-client privilege in its broad sense is available to corporations, and we
so hold." Id. at 323.
128. Id. at 319-24.
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ences in function. All three reflect the fundamental tension within the
corporate enterprise between its unity as a distinct legal entity and the
aggregate nature of its separate and often antagonistic constituent
parts.
Wo Can Speakfor the Corporation
Prior to the recent decision by the United States Supreme Court in
Upjohn Co. v. United States, 29 most federal courts used the "control
group" test to determine who within the corporation could claim the
attorney-client privilege on the corporation's behalf.1 30 Based on an
analogy to the individual client, who acts on the advice received,13 1 the
control group test limits application of the privilege to attorney com-
munications with those corporate agents who can "control or. . .take
a substantial part in a decision about any action which the corporation
may take upon the advice of the attorney."' 32 While the rank of a
corporate employee does not solely determine inclusion within the con-
trol group, 33 in practice, inclusion tends to be limited to senior
management.
34
Supporters of the control group test have justified it on the
grounds that it provides courts, corporations, and their attorneys with a
simple and clearly applicable "bright line" rule for determining who
personifies the corporation for purposes of the attorney-client privi-
lege. 35 In addition, the control group test can be justified on utilitarian
grounds. Arguably, by affording protection to senior management, the
control group test encourages consultation between corporation and
counsel, thus facilitating compliance with the complex web of laws and
regulations applicable to the modern corporation. By denying the pro-
tection of the privilege to most corporate employees, however, the con-
trol group test prevents the corporation from cloaking its affairs in
secrecy detrimental to the proper functioning of the adversary system.
In Upjohn, the Supreme Court rejected the control group test in
129. 449 U.S. 383 (1981).
130. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigation (Sun Co.), 599 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir.
1979).
131. See Note, The Privileged Few: The Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corpora-
tions, 20 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 288, 301-02 (1972).
132. City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483, 485 (E.D. Pa.
1962).
133. See id.
134. See United States v. Upjohn Co., 600 F.2d 1223, 1225 (6th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 449
U.S. 383 (1981).
135. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 474; Note, The Attorney-Client Privi-
lege in the Corporate Setting: A Suggested Approach, 69 MICH. L. REv. 360, 373 (1970).
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the context of a special investigation. The Court considered a special
investigation into questionable or illegal corporate practices, 36 which
is typically conducted by attorneys and is undertaken primarily to
gather information from sources within the corporation. The basis of
the control group test is an analogy to the individual client. 137 The
fundamental flaw in this analogy is well illustrated in the context of a
special investigation, because in this context it becomes obvious that a
corporation gathers information for communication to its attorney in a
way radically different from an individual. For an individual, "the
provider of the information and the person who acts on the lawyer's
advice are one and the same."' 138 For a corporation, however, those
who know the relevant facts and those who make the decisions are sel-
dom the same.
If an attorney is to give sound advice to the control group-those
who make the decisions-information from outside the control group
must be made available to the attorney. 139 Therefore, unless the con-
trol group were extended to include those employees who possess the
requisite information, the privilege would be of little value. Many
communications necessary to effective counsel would suffer from ab-
sence of evidentiary protection. Protecting all employees who possess
relevant information, on the other hand, could lead to inclusion of al-
most every corporate employee within the ambit of the control group,
and thus completely vitiate any effort to segregate those who should
speak for the corporation from those who should not.
To avoid the difficulties of the control group approach, the empha-
sis can be shifted to a determination of which communications to an
attorney merit the protection of the attorney-client privilege. The sub-
ject matter test was first formulated in Harper & Row Publishers v.
Decker,14° and was recently adopted by the Supreme Court in
Upjohn.141 According to this test, which permits the extension of the
protection of the privilege to most corporate employees,
an employee of a corporation, though not a member of its control
group, is sufficiently identified with the corporation so that his com-
munication to the corporation's attorney is privileged where the em-
ployee makes the communication at the direction of his superiors in
136. 449 U.S. at 386-87.
137. See text accompanying notes 131-32 supra.
138. 449 U.S. at 391.
139. Id.
140. 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970), afdper cuiiam by an equally divided court, 400 U.S.
348 (1971).
141. See 449 U.S. at 397.
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the corporation and where the subject matter upon which the attor-
ney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with in the com-
munication is the performance by the employee of the duties of his
employment. 142
The subject matter test has been criticized as too broad, because it
requires only that an employee communication be made at the request
of a superior and that it relate to the duties of his or her employment. 1
43
Corporations could create a vast zone of silence, and protect much in-
formation as privileged, by directing "all their employees to channel all
their business reports to corporate attorneys."144
In addition to this criticism, other problems are associated with
extending to corporations a privilege that was originally conceived for
individuals. The attorney-client privilege protects communications be-
tween attorney and client and not the underlying information that is
communicated by the client to the attorney. 145 For an individual, it is
nearly impossible to shield information from testimonial disclosure by
communicating it to an attorney. For a corporation, however, informa-
tion can be withheld by structuring the information-gathering process
so that the information generated is first put in an intelligible form in
communications to corporate counsel. Thus, the individual eyewitness
obtains information through his or her senses, and stores it in his or her
memory, while the modern corporation, with thousands of employees,
processes thousands of pieces of information. 146 The multiplicity of
sources and the complexity of corporate information suggests the po-
tential for corporations to shield meaningful information from testimo-
nial disclosure by making use of the nexus between information and
communication in a way that is not available to the individual.
147
The means of gathering and disseminating information within the
corporation create other important problems in determining workable
parameters for the privilege in the corporate context. These problems
include (1) whether and to what extent an attorney's fact or informa-
tion-gathering services for a corporate client can be deemed to consti-
142. Harper & Row Publishers v. Decker, 423 F.2d at 491-92.
143. See, e.g., In re Ampicillin Antitrust Litigation, 25 Fed. R. Serv. 2d (Callaghan)
1248, 1255 (D.D.C. 1978).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1258-59.
146. See text accompanying notes 152-54 infra.
147. The corporation could not thus shield the individuals who are the original sources
of information or the information that was initially generated. Access to these may be of
little value, however, as the sources may be too scattered and the information too fragmen-
tary to be of any practical use in the course of an ongoing adversary judicial proceeding.
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tute the rendition of legal services; 148 (2) whether and to what extent
dissemination of confidential attorney-client communications within
corporate ranks constitutes a waiver of the privilege; 149 and
(3) whether attorney communications with a corporation's former em-
ployees in the course of gathering information for the purpose of ren-
dering legal advice ought to be protected under the privilege. 50
The Role of an Attorney as Special Investigative Counsel
The modern corporation must use counsel to gather and transmit
certain internal information, especially in connection with a special in-
vestigation into questionable or illegal corporate practices. 15 1 Typi-
cally, these special investigations have been either initiated voluntarily
by corporations to forestall possible SEC action, 152 or requested by the
SEC pursuant to the terms of a consent decree. 153 Because of the struc-
ture of the large modern corporation, important information concern-
ing the activities of its employees or agents may not reach those who
are responsible for its management. For instance, an employee or
agent may bribe foreign officials to obtain business for the corporation
without the knowledge of the corporation's senior management. To
eradicate this practice, management may need complete and accurate
information concerning the precise nature and extent of such activities
148. See notes 151-79 & accompanying text infra.
149. The attorney-client privilege may be waived by the client's voluntary disclosure of
privileged communications or by his or her failure to object to such disclosure by another.
See, eg., United States v. Bump, 605 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1979); In re Penn Central Com-
mercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 511. The
issue of how far a privileged communication can be disseminated within the corporation
without constituting a waiver of the privilege has not been clearly or uniformly settled.
Compare Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del.
1954) (for purposes of the privilege the relevant distinction is between all those who are
affiliated with the corporation and mere outsiders) and United States v. United Shoe Ma-
chinery Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 359 (D. Mass. 1950) (same) with Natta v. Hogan, 392 F.2d
686, 693 (10th Cir. 1968) (confidentiality is lost if communications go beyond "control
group") and Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D.
397,401 (E.D. Va. 1975) (same) and Gorzegno v. Maguire, 62 F.R.D. 617, 620-21 (S.D.N.Y.
1973) (same). Another approach maintains that no waiver takes place so long as the dissem-
ination of privileged communications within the corporation is limited to those who "need
to know." Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 609 (8th Cir. 1978).
150. The Supreme Court was presented with this issue in Upjohn, but did not rule on it.
449 U.S. at 394 n.3.
151. See Block & Barton, Internal Cor.porate Investigations: Maintaining the Confidenti-
ality of a Corporate Client's Communications with Investigative Counsel, 35 Bus. LAW. 5, 5-6
(1979).
152. See id. at 8.
153. See, ag., Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 82 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ga. 1979); SEC v.
Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594 (D.D.C. 1978).
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within the corporation. As those engaged in the practice may not read-
ily come forth with the relevant information, a factfinding investigation
may be launched within the corporation.
Special investigations into questionable or illegal corporate prac-
tices are customarily conducted by attorneys.1 54 An attorney con-
ducting a special investigation performs tasks similar to those
performed in ordinary litigation, in which he or she pursues discovery
and relevant evidencefrom an adversary. An attorney conducting such
an investigation, however, is not necessarily acting as a legal advisor.
If the attorney conducting a special investigation is acting in an
investigative, rather than a legal, capacity, the attorney-client privilege
does not protect the communications with corporate employees. 155 The
attorney's role, therefore, has become a pivotal issue in the determina-
tion of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege to communica-
tions made in the course of a special investigation. 56 The resolution of
this issue depends principally on two factors: whether the investigation
has been voluntarily undertaken by the corporation, and the nature
and scope of the services to be performed by the special counsel. If the
corporation institutes a special investigation pursuant to the terms of a
judgment or a consent decree, rather than voluntarily, the privilege is
likely to be held inapplicable because the corporation is not the "client"
of the special counsel. 157 When the investigation is voluntarily under-
taken, the determination of whether the special counsel was acting in
the capacity of a legal adviser rather than as an investigator often turns
on the particular phrasing of the corporate resolution defining the role
of the special counsel.
58
In Diversied Industries v. Meredith,159 which involved a voluntary
investigation of a possible "slush fund" used to bribe purchasing
154. Cf. Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 607 (8th Cir. 1978) (upon settle-
ment of lawsuit, corporation hired attorneys to conduct investigation of certain business
practices disclosed in the course of litigation).
155. The privilege is applicable only when the attorney acts as a legal adviser. See note
I supra.
156. See, e.g., Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 602 (8th Cir. 1978); Os-
terneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 82 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ga. 1979); SEC v. Canadian Javelin,
Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594, 596 (D.D.C. 1978).
157. See notes 170-79 & accompanying text infra.
158. Compare SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594, 600 (D.D.C. 1978) (cor-
poration hired law firm for its "expertise in the relevant field" rather than "to give legal
advice") and Osterneck v. E.T. Barwick Indus., 82 F.R.D. 81 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (corporation,
as part of consent decree, agreed to appoint counsel to "investigate and report" to board,
SEC, and shareholders) with Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 386 (1981) (corpo-
ration voluntarily initiated investigation).
159. 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978).
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agents, the resolution of the board of directors authorizing the special
investigation did not explicitly state that the special counsel was re-
tained to provide legal advice. Instead, the relevant provision of the
resolution provided that the special counsel should conduct an investi-
gation "for the purposes of eliciting facts, making certain findings, and
providing to the Board of Directors. .. a report possibly containing
recommendations as to course of action, so that the Board of Directors
.. .may properly discharge its duties. ... 160
In light of this resolution, a three-judge panel of the Eighth Circuit
held that the special counsel's communications with officers and em-
ployees of the corporation were not privileged because the special
counsel had not been retained to give legal advice to the corporation.
61
The panel found that the special counsel had been employed solely to
conduct an "investigation of facts" and "to make business recommen-
dations."'162 On rehearing en banc, however, the Court of Appeals re-
versed, holding that the attorney-client privilege was applicable.
63
While recognizing that "[i]t is not easy to frame a definite test for dist-
inguishing legalfrom nonlegal advice,"' the court held that the fact
that the investigation was entrusted to attorneys was a prima facie indi-
cation that the purpose of the corporation had been to seek legal
advice.165
The Supreme Court in Upjohn considered another facet of the is-
sue of whether attorneys conducting a special investigation are acting
in the capacity of legal advisers. Upjohn involved a voluntary internal
investigation into questionable payments to foreign officials conducted
under the supervision of the corporation's general counsel, who was
also its vice president and secretary. Although one of the company's
purposes in initiating the investigation was to obtain legal advice re-
garding the questionable payments, 66 the United States argued that
the role of Upjohn's general counsel in conducting the investigation
was that of a superior corporate officer. 167 The Supreme Court did not
address this argument, but found that the rendition of legal advice was
one of the chief purposes of the investigation. 68 Nevertheless, the dual
160. Id. at 607.
161. Id. at 600.
162. Id. at 603.
163. d. at 611.
164. Id. at 610 (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2296) (emphasis in original).
165. Id.
166. 449 U.S. at 394.
167. 49 U.S.L.W. 3341 (Nov. 11, 1980) (editorial summary of oral argument in Upjohn).
168. 449 U.S. at 394.
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role of an attorney who is both general counsel and a senior officer of
the corporation is another source of uncertainty concerning the availa-
bility of the attorney-client privilege.
169
The corporation is the client of the attorney who renders services
in connection with a voluntary special corporate investigation. In the
context of a judicially mandated investigation, however, the identity of
the special counsel's client is not clear. For instance, when pursuant to
a consent decree a corporation is obliged to hire a special counsel to
perform a special investigation or to monitor its activities for disclosure
to a government agency, arguably the agency rather than the corpora-
tion is the client.
170
The court overcame the difficulties of differentiating between legal
and non-legal services and of identifying the client by creating a hybrid
privilege in In re LTV Securities Litigation.17 1 This hybrid privilege
draws from both the attorney-client privilege and a governmental privi-
lege that protects from disclosure information or documents obtained
by government employees in the course of an ongoing investigation. 172
Unlike the attorney in Diversjfed Industries or in Upjohn, the at-
torney conducting the LTV investigation was not hired by the corpora-
tion voluntarily, but was hired pursuant to the terms of a consent
decree. 173 The special counsel in LTV was not confined to investigat-
ing or monitoring corporate activities; the special counsel also advised
the corporation on whether to bring legal actions against certain direc-
tors, officers, or employees in connection with certain questionable ac-
counting practices. 174 Moreover, it was the corporation's shareholders
169. See SEC v. Gulf& Western Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675 (D.D.C. 1981), in which com-
munications to a corporation's outside general counsel who was also director, secretary, and
a member of the pension advisory committee were held not privileged because they were
made to him in his capacity as corporate director. The court noted that, because of the
general counsel's "many roles and the amount of time he spent at Gulf & Western's offices,
it cannot be assumed that all his discussions with corporate officials involved legal advice."
Id. at 683.
170. This in essence was the holding in SEC v. Canadian Javelin, Ltd., 451 F. Supp. 594
(D.D.C. 1978), in which the court rejected a claim of privilege on the grounds that special
counsel, who was engaged pursuant to the terms of a consent decree to monitor the corpora-
tion's compliance with the federal securities laws, was accountable to the court and the gen-
eral public rather than to the corporation. Id. at 596.
171. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 97,969 (N.D. Tex. May 13,
1981).
172. Id. at 90,996. "SEC regulations prohibit the disclosure of information or docu-
ments obtained by employees of the Commission in the course of an investigation." Id. at
90,998.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 90,995-96.
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who sought discovery from special counsel. 175 Finally, whereas in Di-
versffedIndustries and Upjohn, a private litigant and the Internal Rev-
enue Service, respectively, were seeking to discover communications
relating to a previously completed voluntary investigation, the share-
holders in LTV were seeking to discover communications pertaining to
an ongoing judicially mandated investigation. 176
The need for a hybrid privilege in LTV arose from the inadequacy
of both the attorney-client privilege and the governmental privilege to
protect the communications sought to be discovered. Additionally, the
special counsel was acting in the dual capacity of factual investigator
and legal advisor, rendering services to a different "client" in each role:
The Special [Counsel's] function is a hybrid of two roles, those of
government investigator and privately retained counsel .... But,
because the Special [Counsel] does not fit neatly within the limits of
either conventional role, the privilege which the Special [Counsel]
may assert is not contiguous with that afforded either "client" alone.
Rather, the sphere of confidentiality which the Special [Counsel]
might expect to enjoy is a synthesis of the privileges available to his
"clients" were he serving in the roles of government investigator or
private investigatory counsel.
177
The attorney-client privilege would not protect those communications
that relate to the purely investigative aspect of the attorney's function;
the governmental privilege, on the other hand, would not protect those
communications that relate to the legal advice that the attorney is obli-
gated to render to the corporation.
The court in LTV justified the novel, hybrid privilege, reasoning
that if the special counsel had acted exclusively as either a corporate
attorney rendering legal services or a government investigator, the
communications with agents of the corporation would have been ade-
quately protected from disclosure either by the attorney-client privilege
or by the governmental privilege. 178 Underlying this reasoning, how-
ever, may be an erroneous application of the maxim that the whole is
no more than the sum of its parts. If a government investigator also
renders legal advice to the corporation's board of directors, communi-
cations regarding the investigation should not necessarily be protected
against disclosure to the corporate shareholders.
179
175. Id. at 90,995.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 90,996.
178. Id. at 90,997-99.
179. An exception to the general rule that attorney-client communications made in the
presence of third parties do not fall within the scope of the attorney-client privilege applies
to communications between two or more clients having an interest in common and their
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Attempts to justify the attorney-client privilege in connection with
special investigations raise difficult questions. Justification under the
theory of rights would depend on an indissoluble bond between the
ownership and control of property, which is difficult to formulate.
80
On the other hand, the elasticity of the utility principle' 8 ' might appear
to justify application of the attorney-client privilege to special investi-
gations. Upon closer examination, however, the privilege also appears
unsupported by this theory.
Except when a corporation is sued by its own shareholders, the
nature of the harm caused by application of the attorney-client privi-
lege to communications between a corporation and its special counsel is
the same as the harm in the context of an individual client: the con-
cealment of relevant information. The magnitude of the harm, how-
ever, is likely to be greater in the case of the corporation, particularly
when certain of its sources of information are beyond the reach of the
adversary seeking discovery. For example, if communications between
special counsel and corporate agents or employees who reside abroad
and who are beyond the reach of United States courts are deemed priv-
ileged, not only the communications themselves but also the informa-
tion possessed by such agents may be withheld from the adversary and
the ultimate fact finder.
It is difficult to measure the benefits of according the privilege to
corporations, whether the benefits inure primarily to the corporate cli-
ent or to the special counsel. The benefits that the privilege confers on
individuals, such as protection of their right to privacy or reducing
their alienation from the legal system, are not equally applicable to cor-
porations. Corporations have more restricted privacy rights than indi-
viduals; 82 in the absence of the privilege, corporations are less likely to
become alienated from the legal system because they continually re-
attorney(s) who is (are) retained or consulted in common. This exception, also known as the
"joint defense" exception, has been applied in cases involving actual or potential co-defend-
ants. See, e.g., Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 253 (5th Cir.
1977); Hunydee v. United States, 355 F.2d 183 (9th Cir. 1965); Continental Oil Co. v. United
States, 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated No-
vember 16, 1974, 406 F. Supp. 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). Actual or potential co-defendants
jointly confronting the investigatory right of government have a "community of interests"
that is of an entirely different order than that between LTV and the SEC. If there is any
community of interest between the corporate client, which has not voluntarily launched the
special investigation, and the governmental "client," which did request the investigation,
this community of interest would appear to be limited to a mutual desire to keep certain
information beyond the reach of third parties.
180. See notes 106-13 & accompanying text supra.
181. See note 77 supra.
182. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 484.
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quire legal services.18 3
In addition, the privilege bolsters the communication between an
attorney and an individual client, but may not do so for the communi-
cation between an attorney and a corporate client. The privilege facili-
tates access to the relevant information that the attorney needs to
provide the best possible legal representation. 18 The privilege may be
less likely, however, to encourage full disclosure by a corporate client
to its special counsel. 185 The corporate client's interests are not com-
pletely aligned with the special counsel, who may be acting in part as a
government agent. 86 These differences suggest a less compelling need
for the privilege to protect communications between the corporation
and its special counsel. Thus, the utilitarian justification for the privi-
lege cannot be transported automatically into the corporate arena.
Theories of the privilege that reject the possibility of a reconcilia-
tion between individual and social objectives also do not justify ex-
tending the scope of the privilege to a special counsel. Justifications
emphasizing the protection of the individual's autonomy, dignity, and
privacy are less compelling in the context of an artificial entity such as
a corporation.8 7 Similarly, the corporation has less need than the indi-
vidual for a "legal friend."' 88 Thus, the structural differences that dis-
tinguish the corporation from the individual raise substantial questions
concerning the desirability of extending the attorney-client privilege to
corporations.
Divergence of Interests in Shareholder Litigation
Proponents of a Lockean concept of property cannot readily jus-
tify the application of the attorney-client privilege in the context of
shareholder litigation against the corporation. Such litigation intensi-
fies the tension inherent in the division of ownership and control, and
183. See note 77 supra.
184. See notes 75-76 & accompanying text supra.
185. Even an officer or director of the corporation cannot claim the protections of the
attorney-client privilege concerning his or her communications with corporate counsel, once
the corporation has voluntarily waived its privilege. In re Grand Jury Proceedings, Detroit,
Mich., Aug., 1977, 434 F. Supp. 648, 650 (E.D. Mich. 1977), afl'd, 570 F.2d 562 (6th Cir.
1978); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029, 1034 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
186. See note 170 & accompanying text supra.
187. See Attorney-Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 484.
188. See Simon, supra note 3, at 109. On the other hand, the justification based on the
analogy of the adversary trial to a game is applicable equally to the corporation and to the
individual. See note 80 supra. Even that justification, however, does not extend to special
investigations, in which the counsel's relation to the corporate client's agents or employees
who possess relevant information is often adversarial.
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places the adversary system on a collision course with the broader
socio-economic universe of the corporation and its shareholders. Gen-
erally, those in control of the corporation are required to subordinate
their self-interests to those of shareholders. 8 9 As the owners of the cor-
poration, shareholders would usually appear to be entitled to access to
communications between the corporation's management and its attor-
neys. When those in control of the corporation bppose the sharehold-
ers in litigation, however, such a subordination frustrates the
adversarial system' 90 because both parties need the full protections ac-
corded other litigants.
Because of this conflict between the rights of ownership and the
requirements of the adversary system, it is difficult to invoke the theory
of rights to justify the corporate attorney-client privilege in shareholder
litigation.' 9 ' On the other hand, because it relies on the balancing of
conflicting claims, utilitarianism seems a more likely source ofjustifica-
tion for the privilege in this context. Thus, in the seminal case of Gar-
ner v. Woofinbarger,192 the court attempted to define the limits of the
corporate privilege in shareholder suits through a balancing of
interests.
In Garner, the shareholders brought a class action against the cor-
poration and certain officers and directors. The Fifth Circuit found
that the applicability of the privilege depended upon a balancing of the
injury that would result from disclosure and the benefit that would re-
sult from the correct disposal of the litigation. 93 Recognizing that
"corporate management must manage," and that a part of the manage-
rial task is to seek and receive legal advice, the court acknowledged
that management had a genuine interest in protection from the con-
stant harassment of a small group of dissatisfied shareholders. 94 The
court emphasized, however, that "management does not manage for
itself," but rather for the benefit of the corporation's shareholders. 95
Therefore, the court stated, the privilege should not be allowed "if all,
or substantially all, stockholders desire to inquire into the attorney's
communications with corporate representatives who have only nominal
189. See note 110 supra.
190. Placing corporate management in an adversarial position to the corporation's
shareholders arguably can aid in the discovery of the truth. See note 112 supra.
191. See notes 111-12 & accompanying text supra.
192. 430 F.2d 1093 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 974 (1971).





ownership interests, or even none at all."' 96 The Garner court con-
cluded that the corporation should not be barred automatically from
asserting the privilege merely because those seeking discovery are
shareholders.197 When shareholders sue the corporation and charge it
with having acted contrary to their interest, however, the court held
that they should be given the opportunity to show cause why the privi-
lege should be inapplicable in the particular instance.198
The Garner "good cause" test shifts from a fixed rule to a balanc-
ing of interests analysis that makes it difficult to predict whether a
given communication will be protected by the privilege. 199 Under a
fixed-rule approach, while there may be controversy concerning which
communications ought to come under the purview of the privilege,
once a communication is deemed privileged it is entitled to absolute
protection. Under a balancing of interests approach, however, a com-
munication may be protected from disclosure in one shareholder suit
but not in another. Therefore, no communications between a corpora-
tion and its attorneys are absolutely immune from future disclosure.
Several of the Garner "good cause" criteria underscore the difficul-
ties of applying rules to the corporation that were fashioned for the
individual.2 0° One factor noted by the court was whether the commu-
nication sought to be disclosed relates to legal advice in connection
with the litigation in which the shareholders seek discovery.20' Use of
this factor to determine whether the privilege is applicable could de-
prive the corporation and its spokespersons of fundamental rights that
196. Id. The interests of the shareholders, however, are not always opposed to those of
management. Management's interest in seeking and following legal advice often is fully
consistent with the shareholders' interest in having the corporation properly managed. Id.
In such cases, the availability of the attorney-client privilege for the corporation would bene-
fit shareholders as well as management.
197. Id. at 1103.
198. Id. at 1103-04. The court identified several criteria to be used in determining
whether there is "good cause" to overcome the privilege, including "the number of share-
holders and the percentage of stock they represent; the bona fides of the shareholders; the
nature of the shareholders' claim and whether it is obviously colorable; the apparent neces-
sity or desirability of the shareholders having the information and the availability of it from
other sources; whether, if the shareholders' claim is of wrongful action by the corporation, it
is of action criminal, or illegal but not criminal, or of doubtful legality; whether the commu-
nication'related to past or to prospective actions; whether the communication is of advice
concerning the litigation itself; the extent to which the communication is identified versus
the extent to which the shareholders are blindly fishing; the risk of revelation of trade secrets
or other information in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interest for independent
reasons." Id.
199. See A4torney-Client Privilege, supra note 3, at 475.
200. See note 198 supra.
201. 430 F.2d at 1104.
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an individual would possess as a party to an adversarial judicial pro-
ceeding. Thus, when almost all the shareholders join in the suit and
their claims are obviously colorable, this balancing of interests would
suggest denying the privilege. Such a result, however, would ignore the
corporation's rights as a litigant, entitled to fundamental fairness and
equal treatment in judicial proceedings.
In Panter v. Marshall Field & Co .,202 this tension was resolved in
favor of preserving the integrity of the adversary system of justice.
Panter involved a class action brought by shareholders for alleged vio-
lations of the federal securities laws in connection with a tender offer.
The suit was joined by ninety-five percent of the corporation's share-
holders, and the court found "good cause" for compelling disclosure of
all the attorney-client communications that related to the tender of-
fer. 203 The court, however, did not find "good cause" for requiring dis-
closure of attorney-client communications that related to the litigation
itself.2°4 Accordingly, Panter suggests that the protection bestowed by
the corporate attorney-client privilege upon legal advice sought and re-
ceived in connection with shareholder suits will not be slighted in the
balancing applied in the "good cause" test. If the privilege concerns
legal advice about the shareholder suit itself, the privilege cannot be set
aside, thus preserving the integrity of the adversary system at the ex-
pense of the unity of the corporate enterprise.
A further erosion of shareholders' rights is implied in In re LTV
Securities Litigation.2°5 Unlike the communications held to be privi-
leged in Panter, those sought to be discovered by the shareholders in
LTV related not to the shareholder suit itself, but rather to the corpo-
rate wrongdoing that gave rise to suit. Lending significant weight to
the Garner criterion and distinguishing between communications that
related to past events and those that concerned prospective actions, the
LTV court rejected the shareholders' request to discover "after-the-fact
communications concerning offenses already completed. '' 2°6 The court
found that application of the Garner criteria required that it sustain
LTV's claim of privilege. Otherwise, "[f]orced disclosure of counsel's
remedial advice would do great injury to the corporation's interest in
self-investigation . "... 207 Hence, the limited encroachment in Panter
202. 80 F.R.D. 718 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
203. Id. at 723.
204. Id. at 724.
205. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,969 (N.D. Tex. May 13,
1981).




on the shareholders' rights of ownership was extended in LTV to en-
courage corporations to undertake special investigations into question-
able or illegal practices.
Significantly, the court in LTV denied shareholders access to in-
formation that corporate management had been forced to share with
the SEC.208 This denial further undermines the traditional theory of
property. Moreover, by allowing the government to be interposed be-
tween the corporation's owners and its managers, the court seems to
have blurred the distinction between a shareholder and a mere
outsider.
The erosion of traditional individualist notions- in -the .context of
corporations is evidenced by another criterion suggested in Garner.
The court observed that, in a shareholder suit, proper weight should be
accorded to "the risk of revelation of trade secrets or other information
in whose confidentiality the corporation has an interestfor independent
reasons.' '209 This suggests that interests apart from those of manage-
ment and shareholders deserve recognition in the context of the corpo-
rate enterprise.210 Included among these are the interests that
employees, creditors, and customers of a corporation may have in the
corporation's trade or other commercial secrets. Therefore, not only
the split between ownership and control, but also the extension of the
corporate sphere of interests beyond its traditional limits, mandate dif-
ferent treatment for the corporation and the individual with regard to
the attorney-client privilege.
Review of the proper scope for the attorney-client privilege in the
context of the corporation has shown an attempt to extend individualist
concepts to the corporation. Under certain circumstances, such as
when its adversary is another, unrelated entity, the corporation behaves
like an individual and should be entitled to the same privilege as the
individual. When the corporation is sued by its own shareholders,
however, the justifications for the privilege are less firm. Indeed, justifi-
cation under the theory of rights becomes inapplicable, and the benefits
of utilitarian justifications are less compelling. Furthermore, applica-
tion of the Garner criteria deprives both the corporation and the share-
holders of any certainty about whether the privilege will be upheld.
208. Id.
209. 430 F.2d at 1104 (emphasis added).
210. Cf. SEC v. Gulf& Western Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 686 (D.D.C. 1981) (corpora-
tion's attorney-client privilege might yield to public interest protected by SEC); Broad v.
Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 95,894 (N.D.
Tex. Feb. 18, 1977) (corporation may not assert privilege against its debenture holders to
whom it owes a fiduciary duty).
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The SEC and the Shift from Negative to Positive Rights
Historically, when the individual has been largely self-sufficient
and capable of pursuing self-interests, negative rights and duties have
promoted both the individual's self-interests and the good of society.21'
In the case of the typical modem shareholder who lacks control over
the management of the corporation, however, realization of self-inter-
est seems to require positive rights.212 Once such positive rights are
established, proper allocation and distribution of the entitlements that
they create requires the establishment of an administrative system, ca-
pable of shaping the future of society through the implementation of
regulatory schemes. 213 This contrasts sharply with the adversary sys-
tem's paradigmatic role as a relatively passive governmental mecha-
nism primarily geared to the redress of past individual wrongs.
The split between ownership and control of a corporation permits
"material" information2 4 concerning the corporation to remain within
the exclusive possession of the corporation's management, without ever
reaching its shareholders. Without access to such important informa-
tion, shareholders lack the means to pursue their self-interests as own-
ers of the corporation. This split thus affords unscrupulous corporate
managers, operating in a regulatory vacuum, ample opportunity to de-
fraud shareholders and to infringe on their ownership rights, and poses
a serious threat to the legitimacy of the corporation in a society devoted
to individualism. 215
211. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 479-84.
212. When merely left to his or her own devices, such shareholder generally lacks the
means to obtain the information necessary to make decisions concerning his or her interest
in the corporation.
213. Positive rights, as opposed to negative rights, are not largely self-executing. For
instance, a positive right to health care is beyond the grasp of the individuals who are enti-
tled to it, unless society can institute an organizational structure capable of delivering it to
them. Ultimately, whether positive entitlements flow from positive rights or a vision of the
common good, their distribution requires the implementation of a regulatory scheme. Cf. J.
FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 21-23 (1978) (describing the administrative process's
departures from judicial norms as necessary to assert the public interest in the context of an
industrialized nation).
214. See note 14 supra.
215. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 492-93.
Two basic approaches possibly could eliminate this threat. One approach would at-
tempt to remedy the shareholder's loss of power to pursue his or her legitimate self-interest
by implementing a regulatory scheme designed to grant the shareholder the legitimate fruits
of his or her investment. Focusing on the consequences of shareholder ownership rights, this
approach mandates administrative regulations to define the shareholder's legitimate inter-
ests and to secure these interests on behalf of the shareholders.
The second approach ignores the consequences of shareholder ownership, and instead
favors regulations devised to restore the shareholder's own rights to articulate and pursue his
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To remedy these evils, Congress enacted the federal securities laws
and created the SEC as the administrative agency responsible for their
implementation. 216 Congress sought to establish a regulatory frame-
work that "would ensure a free flow of honest, reliable information in
the securities markets. '2 17 Accordingly, disclosure is the cornerstone of
federal securities regulation;218 the disclosure system administered by
the SEC is designed "to assist investors in making investment decisions
and shareholders in making suffrage decisions." 219 By choosing a regu-
latory scheme designed to promote "full and fair disclosure," Congress
granted shareholders a positive right to material information, rather
than constraining corporate management with an imposed view of the
common good or public interest.
The grant of a positive right entails the imposition of a positive
duty:220 the shareholder's positive right to obtain material information
about the corporation entails a corresponding positive duty of disclo-
sure on the part of management. This positive duty to disclose material
information affects the nature and scope of the attorney-client privilege
in the context of the federal securities laws and the SEC; the corpora-
tion's positive duty to communicate material information to sharehold-
ers and to the investing public has a tendency to blur the distinction
between confidential communications and communications meant to
be publicly disclosed,221 to blur the distinction between past and future
crimes or frauds, 222 and to extend substantially the concepts of crime
and fraud in the context of securities law.
223
or her self-interest. The first of these approaches is essentially utilitarian; it defines the com-
mon good, and then determines the shareholder's rightful entitlements from an assessment
of utilities derived from such vision of the common good. The second approach, which is
reflected in the federal securities laws, is grounded on the theory of rights; its aim is to grant
shareholders rights, and not to guarantee any consequences. Negative rights no longer suf-
fice to secure the shareholder's rights, however, therefore, this second approach must rely on
a grant of positive rights, and on an accompanying increase in regulatory intervention.
216. Id. at 494-96.
217. Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 706 (1980) (Blackmun, J., concurring and dissenting).
218. The purpose of the federal securities laws is to provide for "full and fair disclosure"
to the investing public. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, preamble, 48 Stat. 74.
219. Sommer, Foreword, Survey: Report fthe Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclo-
sure to the Securities and Exchange Commission, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 48, 50 (1978).
220. See note 20 & accompanying text supra.
221. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 516, 518.
222. This consequence is derived from a combination of the other two: the positive duty
to disclose, which imposes a present obligation to disclose a past crime; and the elastic con-
ception of crime and fraud, which makes it possible for an uncured past omission to be
transformed into a present or future crime or fraud. See Hoffman, On Learning ofa Corpo-
rate Cient'r Crime or Fraud--The Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1402-03 (1978).
223. This extension is due in part to the fact that the positive duty to disclose makes it
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Generally, a client is reasonably assured that confidential commu-
nications with his or her counsel will be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. If either the client or the attorney is under a positive duty of
disclosure, however, several arguments support abandoning the privi-
lege. Although a client may intend that the communication that he or
she has a positive duty to disclose remain confidential, it can be argued
that the client's intent is inconsistent with the duty to disclose, and that
therefore the communication cannot be deemed to be confidential. 2
24
As a result of the SEC's pronouncements that attorneys may have an
obligation to make certain disclosures concerning their corporate cli-
ents when the clients fail or refuse to make them on their own, certain
otherwise presumably privileged attorney-client communications con-
cerning matters within the scope of the federal securities laws may be-
come the subject of public disclosure.2 25 If failure to disclose gives rise
to the commission of a crime or fraud, then attorney-client communica-
tions concerning the subject-matter of the requisite disclosure may be
deemed to be in connection with an ongoing or future crime or fraud,
thus falling within the crime or fraud exception to the privilege.226
Scope of Client Confidences
Confidential communications made in the course of seeking legal
advice are generally privileged. When the corporate client seeks advice
concerning its disclosure obligations under the securities laws, however,
the privilege is not always applicable. In the absence of a positive duty
to disclose, the information revealed in the course of confidential attor-
ney-client communications is presumably conveyed for the sole pur-
pose of enabling the attorney to render legal advice. The client's
purpose in revealing confidential information, however, is not easily
ascertained when the client has a positive duty to disclose at least some
of the information communicated. It becomes difficult to draw a mean-
ingful line between information that is communicated solely to obtain
legal advice and information that is ultimately meant for public disclo-
possible for a mere omission or a simple silence to constitute a crime or fraud; and in part to
the aura of vagueness and imprecision that characterizes the concept of materiality. "Over
the years, the SEC has succeeded quite effectively in establishing unusual and at times
unique definitions of the term 'securities fraud.' So broad have these definitions been that
they have been deemed to encompass negligent misstatements and failures to correct prior
misstatements." Cooney, The Registration Process: The Role of the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33
Bus. LAW. 1329, 1337 (1978).
224. See notes 227-33 & accompanying text infra.
225. See notes 234-41 & accompanying text infra.
226. See notes 242-52 & accompanying text infra.
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sure. If the client, not knowing what information to withhold from dis-
closure, communicates all the information in its possession to enable
the attorney to distinguish the information that must be disclosed, two
equally plausible arguments concerning application of the attorney-cli-
ent privilege can be made. One position supports broad application of
the privilege. It views the client's communications to counsel as made
for the purpose of obtaining legal advice, and presumes that the client
had no intention to disclose any information except pursuant to a legal
obligation. Accordingly, only information that the client eventually
decides to disclose should lose the protection afforded by the attorney-
client privilege.
The contrary argument assumes that the client communicates to its
attorney all the information that might be relevant to determine its dis-
closure obligation, and that it intends to comply with such obligation.
At the time it communicates with counsel, the client does not know
which specific information it is obliged to reveal; therefore, the client is
presumed to be prepared to disclose any of the information conveyed
to counsel in the course of seeking legal advice. Arguably, the client
could not have consistently expected that any particular item of infor-
mation communicated to counsel would remain confidential. There-
fore, none of the attorney-client communications concerning the
client's disclosure obligations under the federal securities laws is enti-
tled to the shield of the attorney-client privilege.
Courts have reached different results when confronted with this
dilemma. This issue has been frequently litigated in cases involving
preliminary drafts of disclosure documents that are ultimately intended
to be disseminated to the public.2 7 Some courts have held that such
preliminary drafts are not privileged because the communications
made to an attorney in connection with their preparation relate to a
subject matter that the client ultimately intends to reveal publicly.
228
Other courts, however, have held such preliminary drafts privileged be-
227. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Int'l Airlines [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,945 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1979) (summary of opinion); ef. United States v. Schmidt,
360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (disclosure of tax information to attorney); United States
v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970) (same); United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp.
734 (S.D. Cal. 1953) (disclosure to attorney of information intended to be communicated to
client's superior officers); Brittingham v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 91 (1971) (disclosure to
attorney of information expressly intended to be disclosed to California Franchise Tax
Board).
228. See, eg., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1167-68
(D.S.C. 1974); United States v. Shibley, 112 F. Supp. 734 (S.D. Cal. 1953); Brittingham v.
Commissioner, 57 T.C. 91 (1971); see also United States v. McDonald, 313 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.
1963); Colton v. United States, 306 F.2d 633 (2d Cir. 1962).
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cause the client information that they contain was communicated to the
attorney for the purpose of eliciting a legal opinion, and not of retrans-
mitting it to the public.
22 9
An examination of the degree of discretion exercised by the attor-
ney in the disclosure process reconciles these holdings. In those cases
in which the court upheld the privilege, the attorney appears to have
exercised a substantial amount of discretion regarding the particular
items of information that the client would disclose.2 30 On the other
hand, in those cases in which application of the privilege was denied,
the attorney was a mere "conduit," transmitting information received
from the client by including it in a disclosure document.
2 3'
The federal securities laws mandate only that material information
be disclosed.232 The standard of materiality, however, is not clearly
defined. The typical securities attorney, therefore, will exercise suffi-
cient discretion with respect to preliminary drafts of SEC disclosure
documents that such drafts should be protected by the attorney-client
privilege. 233 In view of the apparent flexibility of the materiality stan-
dard, all confidential attorney-client communications made in connec-
tion with a corporate client's disclosure obligations under the federal
securities laws arguably should be protected by the privilege.
Thus, it is the role of the attorney, and not the intent of the client's
communication, that is the basis of the test for application of the privi-
229. See SEC v. Texas Int'l Airlines, [1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
96,945 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1979) (summary of opinion); cf. United States v. Schmidt, 360 F.
Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973) (disclosure of tax information to attorney); United States v.
Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970) (same).
230. The court in United States v. Schmidt, 360 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. Pa. 1973) stated:
"Although it has been held that information related to that which appears on the [tax] return
must be disclosed, it better comports with the policy of the privilege to protect it; this encour-
ages full disclosure of all relevant information to the legal adviser and allows him to exercise
his professional discretion regarding what to divulge." Accord SEC v. Texas Int'l Airlines,
[1979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,945 (D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1979) (summary
of opinion); United States v. Schlegel, 313 F. Supp. 177 (D. Neb. 1970).
231. See, e.g., Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397 F. Supp. 1146, 1167-68
(D.S.C. 1974).
232. See note 14 supra.
233. See SEC v. Texas Int'l Airlines, Misc. No. 79-0126, Memorandum and Order at 3
(D.D.C. Aug. 3, 1979) (Green, J.): "[W]hen a client sends a draft [of an SEC disclosure
document] to an attorney for review, his intention is to make public only such information
as appears appropriate for publication in the context of and according to the lawyer's ad-
vice . ..
"[D]ocuments otherwise within the attorney-client privilege do not lose their confiden-
tial status merely because the final product was intended to be made public. On the other
hand, if the [SEC] can demonstrate that, with respect to particular documents, the role of
counsel was minor or perfunctory or was intended merely to immunize the documents from
production, the privilege will not apply."
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lege. This shift in emphasis, from the purpose of the client's communi-
cation to the discretion exercised by the attorney with respect to that
communication, indicates some of the profound changes brought about
by developments in the area of SEC regulation.
The SEC and the Positive Duty of Disclosure
In its controversial complaint in SEC v. National Student Market-
ing Cor.,234 the SEC first officially articulated its position that the at-
torney may have, on certain occasions, the duty to disclose confidential
client communications against the client's wishes. Two important de-
velopments lie at the origin of this controversial position: the promul-
gation of increasingly complex systems of laws and regulations that
only experts can decipher, and the grant of positive rights to compen-
sate for the loss of individual power through increasingly complex
forms of social and economic organization.
23 5
As laws and regulations have become more complex, the role of
the attorney has shifted from merely an advocate to include duties as
an expert adviser. Moreover, the attorney is often the only one capable
of determining the lawfulness of a proposed course of action by the
client. In this way, the locus of moral responsibility has partially
shifted from the client to the attorney.23 6 Accompanying this shift is
the diminishing autonomy of the corporate client, who incurs an in-
creasing number of positive duties.
The conjunction of these two developments accounts for both the
increased responsibility that the securities attorney bears in advising
the client and the SEC's efforts to enlist the aid of the securities bar to
monitor corporate compliance with its disclosure obligations. The se-
curities attorney, as an expert, is often in a better position than his or
her client to evaluate the materiality of information for disclosure pur-
poses. Accordingly, the attorney should have broad discretion along
with increased moral responsibility, even if the client remains ulti-
mately responsible for making disclosure decisions. The SEC may be
able to justify its demand that the attorney police a client's compliance
with the securities laws because of the attorney's increased moral re-
sponsibility and the client's lack of any right not to disclose material
234. [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. RP. (CCH) 93,360 (D.D.C. fied Feb.
3, 1972). An extensive list of law review articles and other commentaries on the lawyer's
responsibility and role in connection with a corporate client's disclosure obligations under
the federal securities laws is found in Hoffman, On Learning ofa Corporate Client's Crime or
Fraud-The Lawyer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAw. 1389, 1404 n.38 (1978).
235. Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 500-01.
236. Id. at 502-04.
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information.237 The attorney's increased moral responsibility and as-
serted duty to disclose material information that the client refuses to
disclose may have no direct effect on the determination of the applica-
bility of the privilege. As a practical matter, however, the fulfillment of
this obligation interferes with the preservation of confidences sought to
be protected by the privilege.
The ultimate determination of whether any given item of informa-
tion is material and should be disclosed remains the responsibility of
the client.238 The autonomous exercise of this responsibility by the cli-
ent has been curtailed, however, as a result of the client's lack of exper-
tise concerning the legal materiality of corporate information. When
the attorney alone is competent to determine materiality, his or her de-
cision is, for practical purposes, binding on the client, except when the
attorney concludes that reasonable minds may differ.239 If the attorney
determines that information is material, and if the client nevertheless
refuses to disclose, the attorney might be required to disclose it.24° In
this situation, therefore, the privilege, while presumably attaching ini-
tially to the communications made by the client to enable the attorney
to render legal advice, would become completely nullified as a result of
the rendition of the legal advice sought.24'
237. Id. at 530-31.
238. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1979) provides, in part,
that the "authority to make decisions is exclusively that of the client, and if made within the
framework of law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer." See also id. EC 7-8.
239. For examples of factual situations in which genuine differences concerning disclo-
sure are likely to occur between lawyer and client, see Cooney, The Registration Process:
The Role of the Lawyer in Disclosure, 33 Bus. LAW. 1329, 1335 (1978).
240. Superficially, the SEC's position in National Student Marketing appears to be con-
sistent with the Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The attorney's duty to "blow
the whistle" in that case did not arise until after his client had crossed the permissible
bounds of law. Upon closer analysis, however, this reconciliation between National Student
Marketing and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility is illusory. If the materiality
of information is unclear, Ethical Consideration 7-7 presumably places the ultimate respon-
sibility for determining whether the information is material on the client. If the client de-
cides that the information is not material and refuses to disclose it, but the lawyer disagrees,
then the latter must, under the criteria of National Student Marketing, "blow the whistle" on
his or her client, and disclose the information. Hence, as a practical matter, in such a case,
the ultimate decision rests with the lawyer.
241. Cf. SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., 457 F. Supp. 682 (D.D.C. 1978), in
which the court found it unnecessary to determine the precise scope of the attorneys' duties
because the attorneys had taken no positive step whatsoever. The court noted, however,
that, "at the very least, they were required to speak out at the closing concerning the obvious
materiality of the information. . . . Their silence was not only a breach of this duty to
speak, but in addition lent the appearance of legitimacy to the closing." Id. at 713.
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The Expansion of the Crime and Fraud Exception
The systematic imposition of positive duties is also responsible for
the expansion of the traditional concepts of crime and fraud. Client
communications made for the purposes of consulting an attorney with
respect to an ongoing or contemplated crime or fraud are a well recog-
nized exception to the attorney-client privilege.242 This exception ap-
plies regardless of whether the attorney knows about the client's
ongoing or contemplated crime or fraud.243 In a society structured
through the exclusive distribution of negative rights and negative du-
ties, a crime or fraud must entail an act of commission. When positive
rights and duties are involved, however, a crime or fraud could arise
from an omission or failure to act. In the context of corporate disclo-
sure obligations, the failure to disclose a material fact can give rise to
liability for fraud244 or a crime245 under the federal securities laws. Ac-
cordingly, communication of material information coupled with the cli-
ent's failure or refusal to disclose it could trigger this exception to the
attorney-client privilege.
Consequently, all certainty concerning when the attorney-client
privilege will be applied to client communications regarding disclosure
obligations vanishes. Moreover, the applicability of the privilege is
doubtful even when the client is not seeking legal advice on the subject
of compliance with disclosure obligations because the communications
may fall within the expanded crime or fraud exception created by the
client's positive duty to disclose.24
6
The factor contributing most to the expansion of the concepts of
crime and fraud in the context of the federal securities laws is the
vagueness that surrounds the concept of materiality. In the SEC disclo-
242. See, e.g., Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933); In re Berkley & Co., 629
F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980); Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 342 (5th Cir.
1972); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 155 (D. Del. 1977); United States v.
Mackey, 405 F. Supp. 854, 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1975); SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 230
(D.D.C. 1948).
243. See, eg., United States v. Aldridge, 484 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 921 (1974); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 958 (1971). A litigant seeking disclosure under this exception has the burden of
establishing aprimafacde showing of crime or fraud. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1,
15 (1933); Hercules, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 155 (D. Del. 1977); Burlington
Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26, 40 (D. Md. 1974).
244. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933, § 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976); Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976).
245. See Securities Act of 1933 § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1976); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(a) (1976).
246. For a factual example in which this might take place, see Rosenfeld, supra note 16,
at 520-21.
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sure system, information must be disclosed only if it is "material. '247
What constitutes material information, however, is frequently difficult
to determine, as it may depend on the facts of a case,248 or on the tim-
ing 249 or manner of presentation 250 of information.
Materiality has become one of the most unpredictable and elusive
concepts of the federal securities laws. The SEC itself has despaired
of providing written guidelines to advise wary corporate manage-
ment of the distinctions between material and non-material informa-
tion, and instead has chosen to rely on an after-the-fact case-by-case
approach, seeking injunctive relief when it believes that the appropri-
ate boundaries have been breached.
25'
The unpredictable nature of materiality and the SEC's case-by-
case approach may permit a court to find a corporation in violation of
the securities laws despite a good faith decision that particular informa-
tion is not material and need not be disclosed. The corporation will
then be accused of concealing material information, and may be liable
for fraud. The crime or fraud exception then could be invoked to de-
feat any claim of privilege with respect to the attorney-client communi-
cations that culminated in the original decision not to disclose. The
proponent of the applicability of this exception could satisfy its burden
of showing aprimafacie case of crime or fraud merely by convincing
the tribunal that the omitted information was material. Therefore, only
in cases in which there is a broad consensus concerning the materiality
of a particular item of information can a corporate client predict with
any degree of certainty whether communications with its securities
counsel will be entitled to protection under the attorney-client
privilege.
Thus, application of the crime or fraud exception more severely
restricts the availability of the privilege in the context of corporate dis-
closure obligations than in other settings. This restriction is due, in
part, to the imposition of positive duties that make it possible for omis-
sions to give rise to a crime or fraud,252 and to the lack of a precise
standard of materiality.
Failure to Disclose as a Continuing Violation
One of the most important functions of the attorney-client privi-
247. See note 14 supra.
248. See SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977).
249. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 854, 856 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969).
250. See TSC Indus. v. Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 448-49 (1976).
251. SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 565 F.2d 8, 10 (2d Cir. 1977) (footnote omitted).
252. See note 223 supra.
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lege is to protect fully both client communications and attorney advice
concerning past crimes or frauds. 2 53 Such protection, which is essential
to the preservation of the integrity of the adversary system's adjudica-
tory process, also has constitutional dimensions. 254 If the adversary
system is to function properly, individual litigants must be free to dis-
cuss past wrongdoing with their counsel without fear that their commu-
nications will be revealed to their opponents.
The SEC disclosure system imposes a positive duty to disclose cer-
tain past crimes or frauds,2 55 and the failure to make such disclosure
can itself amount to a crime or fraud.2 56 Thus, an undisclosed past
crime or fraud may become interwoven with the ongoing or future
crime or fraud created by its nondisclosure. While client communica-
tions to an attorney concerning a past crime or fraud initially may fall
within the attorney-client privilege, a subsequent failure to disclose the
past wrongdoing may strip those communications of the privileged
status.
The positive duty to disclose material information is not necessar-
ily inimical to the protection that the attorney-client privilege grants to
communications relating to past crimes or frauds. On a theoretical
level, the positive duty to disclose and the privileged status of commu-
nications relating to past crimes or frauds are entirely independent of
one another; the former seeks to narrow the informational gap between
corporate management and ownership, while the latter seeks to contrib-
ute to the preservation of individual rights in the adversary system of
justice.
In the context of SEC disclosure obligations, past wrongdoing
must be disclosed, not necessarily because it was wrong, but rather be-
cause it occurred; its occurrence is material information, likely to affect
the investment decision of shareholders and the public. 257 If it were
possible to keep the universe of corporate shareholders and the invest-
ing public entirely separate from that of judges, adversaries, and the
authorities charged with the responsibility of punishing criminals, the
253. The attorney-client privilege has consistently given protection to communications
concerning past crimes. See 8 Wigmore, supra note 1, § 2298, at 573; see also In re Berkley
& Co., 629 F.2d 548, 553 (8th Cir. 1980).
254. See notes 86-89 & accompanying text supra.
255. See SEC v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 452 F. Supp. 824, 829-30 (E.D. Wis. 1978)
(failure to disclose bribe constitutes a material omission from the issuer's financial state-
ments, registration statements, periodic reports, and proxy solicitation materials).
256. See Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud--the Lawyer's
Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAW. 1389, 1402-03 (1978). But f. HAZARD, supra note 9, at 27-31 (argu-
ing that the distinction between past and future crimes is unsound).
257. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 521-22.
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requirements of the disclosure system and the preservation of the privi-
lege in the adversary system could simultaneously be satisfied. Disclo-
sure would be mandated for shareholders and the investment public,
and silence made obligatory before judges, adversaries, and the
authorities.
258
From a practical standpoint, however, the world cannot be so radi-
cally divided; implementation of the SEC disclosure system therefore
clashes with attempts to fulfill those objectives of the adversary system
that require applying the attorney-client privilege to communications
relating to past crimes or frauds. In sum, the positive duty to disclose
undermines one of the important protections furnished by the attorney-
client privilege because it cannot, as a practical matter, be reconciled
with certain important requirements of the adversary system of justice.
The Fate of the Attorney-Client Privilege
The displacement of the attorney-client privilege, and the signifi-
cant diminution of the realm in which it remains operative, are not the
result of any design to eradicate the privilege. The mere imposition of
a positive duty to speak must, on occasion, conflict with what is essen-
tially a right to silence. Moreover, some erosion of the attorney-client
privilege must result from the shift from the nearly exclusive reliance
on the adversary system to an increasing dependence on the adminis-
trative process to regulate the distribution of entitlements.259 Funda-
mentally, however, the erosion of the privilege is traceable to the
realignment of relations that originated with the split of the corporate
atom into the separate and distinct realms of ownership and control,
culminating in the new relationships forged by the SEC's attempts to
bridge the gap between corporate ownership and control through the
imposition of a positive duty to disclose.
In the world of atomistic individualism, each individual is free to
pursue self-interest, assisted by counsel. In this sphere, the attorney-
client privilege extends to its farthest boundaries, 260 limited only by a
258. See id.
259. Cf F.T.C. v. TRW, Inc., 628 F.2d 207, 211 (D.C. Cir. 1980): "The very backbone
of an administrative agency's effectiveness in carrying out the congressionally mandated
duties of industry regulation is the rapid exercise of the power to investigate. . . . Because
judicial power is reluctant if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant
to issues in litigation, it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing
that the laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. It has a
power of inquisition, if one chooses to call it that, which is not derived from the judicial
function."
260. See text accompanying notes 90-98 supra.
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narrow crime or fraud exception triggered by willful acts of commis-
sion by the client and not by mere omissions.
261
With the advent of the corporation and the resulting split in the
corporate atom, extension of the attorney-client privilege created two
distinct kinds of problems: structural and functional. The internal
structure, which binds the various elements of the corporation, creates
problems concerning the proper confines of the privilege. Additionally,
corporate management requires a certain degree of autonomy from
shareholders to function efficiently. To preserve the legitimacy of the
corporate vehicle within the ideology of individualism, management
has become obligated to act for the benefit of shareholders. Considera-
tions of functional efficiency have conflicted with considerations of le-
gitimacy, and, more particularly, the requirements of the adversary
system often have become inconsistent with those of the socio-eco-
nomic world. Caught between these conflicting requirements, the at-
torney-client privilege has lost its capacity to grant absolute protection
to those communications at one time clearly within its scope.262
In principle, the SEC's scheme of regulations is designed to oper-
ate with simplicity, interfering only minimally with the affairs of regu-
lated corporations. 263 The SEC has refrained from imposing a
conception of the common good, and instead has attempted to restore
the powers of ownership through a mandatory disclosure scheme. Es-
sentially, this scheme requires only that corporate management make
periodic disclosure of important information in its possession.264
Beneath this apparent simplicity, however, lies a complex regula-
tory maze. The imprecise standard of materiality, makes it nearly im-
possible to determine with any degree of precision which information
should be disclosed.265 The SEC must therefore actively intervene in
the disclosure process and demand that attorneys make certain disclo-
sures in the event their clients refuse to do so.
Because of this maze, the SEC disclosure scheme not only accentu-
261. These willful actions must be serious enough to give rise to a crime or fraud and
not merely the commission of some lesser wrong. But cf. O'Neal & Thompson, Vulnerability
of Professional-Client Privilege in Shareholder Litigation, 31 Bus. LAW. 1775, 1787 (1976)
(some courts in dictum have indicated that the crime or fraud exception to attorney-client
privilege covers communications made for the purposes of committing a tort).
262. See SEC v. Gulf& Western Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 686 (D.D.C. 1981) (SEC, as
protector of public interest, may show good cause to overcome a corporation's attorney-
client privilege). See text accompanying notes 225-26 supra.
263. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 498.
264. See text accompanying notes 217-19 supra.
265. See generally Blackstone, A Roadmap for Disclosure v. A Blueprintfor Fraud, 26
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 74 (1978).
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ates the effects of the split between corporate ownership and control,
but also poses additional obstacles that further erode the vitality of the
attorney-client privilege. For instance, the relation of the corporate cli-
ent and its securities attorney becomes more complex than that of the
individual client and attorney. 266 The securities attorney, in addition to
being an advocate, is also an adviser who provides expert legal ad-
vice267 and an opinion giver whose evaluations may be relied upon by
third parties.268 The attorney as advisor or opinion giver cannot be as
partisan as can the attorney as advocate. As an opinion giver, the se-
curities attorney has certain obligations to the investing public, which
relies on his or her opinion.269 As an adviser, this attorney has some
duty to the corporation's shareholders and to the SEC.270 Conse-
quently, in these two capacities, the securities attorney is an intermedi-
ary between, on the one hand, corporate management and, on the
other, the shareholders, the SEC, and the investing public. As such, the
attorney may have some duty to disclose information obtained from
the client's confidential communications, thus contributing to a further
limitation of the protections afforded by the attorney-client privilege.
While the securities attorney's role varies in relation to the various
participants in the SEC disclosure system, the SEC itself plays a multi-
ple role within its regulatory framework. As an administrative agency,
the SEC performs quasi-legislative, quasi-judicial, and investigatory
functions. The SEC might be posed as a corporation's courtroom ad-
versary, and at other times be aligned with the interests of the corpora-
266. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 502.
267. Cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC7-3 (1979): "Where the
bounds of law are uncertain, the action of a lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as
advocate or adviser. A laywer may serve simultaneously as both advocate and adviser, but
the two roles are essentially different."
268. See generally Fuld, Lawyers' Standards and Responsibilities in Rendering Opinions,
33 Bus. LAW. 1295 (1978); Jennings, The Corporate Lawyers' Responsibilities and Liabilities
in Pending Legal Opinions, 30 Bus. LAW. S-73 (1975).
269. See The Association of the Bar of the City of New York, Report by Special Commit-
tee on Lawyers'Role in Securities Transactions, 32 Bus. LAW. 1879, 1886-88 (1977); Sommer,
Professional Responsibility.- How Did We Get Here?, 30 Bus. LAW. S-95, S-96 (1975). But
see Lipman, The SEC's Reluctant Police Force: A New Role For Lawyers, 49 N.Y.U.L. REv.
437, 445 (1974): "While the trading markets rely upon the integrity of the companies re-
sponsible for disclosure documents, there is little indication of public reliance upon the law-
yers employed by them to assist in preparing documents."
270. See Complaint, SEC v. National Student Marketing Corp., [1971-1972 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 93,360, at 91,913 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 3, 1972); In re
Fields, Sec. Act Release No. 5404 [1973] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 79,407, at 83,175 n.20
(June 18, 1973); Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities Lawyer, [1973-1974
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 79,631, at 83,689-90 (1974).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 33
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
tion.271 Finally, the SEC is the intended recipient of disclosure
documents that corporations are obligated to furnish.
The attorney-client privilege is fully applicable in administrative
proceedings before the SEC and in judicial proceedings in which the
SEC is the adversary.272 When the SEC is performing a different role,
however, the application and the scope of the privilege are not clear.
For instance, in the context of special investigations, applicability of
the privilege depends on such factors as whether the investigation was
voluntary or pursuant to a consent decree, whether special counsel is
primarily an investigator or is also charged with giving the corporation
legal advice.273 Arguably, in voluntary investigations the privilege ap-
plies at least in part because the SEC's relation to the company under-
taking the self-investigation is that of an administrative body that
might commence an investigation or that of a potential adversary.
Conversely, in the case of investigations undertaken pursuant to a con-
sent decree, special counsel is primarily acting as an agent of the SEC
or the court, and accordingly, communications between the investi-
gated company and such counsel are nonconfidential communications
between a corporation and a government agent.274
Consistent with the above analysis of voluntary investigations in
which the SEC seems to function as an independent party, voluntary
disclosure of privileged communications that are made in the course of
an investigation should be considered a full waiver of the privilege with
respect to all other confidential communications on that same subject
matter.275 Some recent cases have held, however, that such disclosure
to the SEC gives rise only to a limited waiver.276 Underlying these
decisions is a utilitarian objective of encouraging cooperation with the
SEC.277 Such considerations, however, do not fully justify these hold-
271. This occurred inInre LTV Securities Litigation, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. R P. (CCH) 97,969, at 90,981 (N.D. Tex. May 13, 1981).
272. See McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir.), ceri. denied, 301 U.S. 684 (1937):
"We assume... that the conduct of investigations under the Securities Acts is subject to the
same testimonial privileges as judicial proceedings ..... " 4ccord SEC v. Kingsley, 510 F.
Supp. 561, 563-64 (D.D.C. 1981); SEC v. Harrison, 80 F. Supp. 226, 230-32 (D.D.C. 1948).
273. See notes 151-79 & accompanying text sufpra.
274. Id.
275. See note 149 sufpra. For discussions of the scope of waiver, see Hercules, Inc. v.
Exxon Corp., 434 F. Supp. 136, 156 (D. Del. 1977); Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc.,
397 F. Supp. 1146, 1161 (D.S.C. 1975).
276. See Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596, 611 (8th Cir. 1978); Byrnes v. IDS
Realty Trust, 85 F.R.D. 679 (S.D.N.Y. 1980). But see Permian Corp. v. United States, 665
F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1981); In re Penn Central Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 435
(S.D.N.Y. 1973).
277. In Diversified Indus. v. Meredith, 572 F.2d 596 (8th Cir. 1978), the court noted that
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ings27s unless one assumes that the SEC's relation to those it regulates
is closer, in the context of voluntary special investigations, than the typ-
ical relation among independent parties.
In re LTV Securities Litigation279 provides perhaps the best exam-
ple of the extent to which traditional relations, originating in atomistic
individualism, have been realigned. In that case, LTV shareholders
were seeking discovery of confidential communications between LTV
and its special counsel, which had been made in the course of a special
investigation commenced pursuant to a consent decree. The SEC had
an interest in opposing the shareholders' request because the investiga-
tion had not yet been completed at the time the shareholders sought
discovery. On the other hand, LTV had a colorable claim that discov-
ery should be denied because the special counsel's function was not
merely investigatory, but also included giving legal advice to the com-
pany. The court correctly determined, however, that neither the attor-
ney-client privilege nor the governmental privilege applicable to
ongoing investigations could protect the communications from discov-
ery. Instead, the court relied on a hybrid privilege combining elements
of the attorney-client and governmental privileges to protect the com-
munications from discovery. 280
Underlying the hybrid privilege recognized in LTV is a realign-
ment of relations, inserting the SEC between corporate management
and its shareholders. The SEC and corporate management were
aligned against the shareholders for distinct purposes: the SEC sought
to preserve the integrity of its investigatory efforts, and corporate man-
agement sought to defend its rights as an actual or potential litigant in
an adversary proceeding. The adoption of this hybrid privilege could
be justified under utilitarianism.28' The most noteworthy aspect of
if disclosure to the SEC gave rise to a full waiver, beneficial internal investigations might not
be voluntarily undertaken by corporations. Id. at 611. The court in In re Penn Central
Commercial Paper Litigation, 61 F.R.D. 453 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), however, was not persuaded
by such an argument: "Although it is probably correct to assume that a witness would be
less likely to cooperate with authorities if his testimony, given in a nonpublic proceeding, is
subject to discovery in later civil litigation, this factor alone is an inadequate basis for a
court to break new legal ground against the overwhelming weight of authority." Id. at 464.
278. See Permian Corp. v. United States, 665 F.2d 1214, 1220-22 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (criti-
cizing limited waiver rule).
279. [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,969 (N.D. Tex. May 13,
1981), discussed in text accompanying notes 171-79 supra.
280. Id. at 90,996-99.
281. "The use of. . . Special [Counsel] has advantages for both the corporation and the
SEC; it 'benefits the corporation by minimizing Federal interference into its corporate af-
fairs, and benefits the SEC by allowing it to employ its limited investigative resources else-
where.'" Id. at 90,999.
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LTV, however, is that the court refused to expand the attorney-client
privilege to protect the interests of an administrative agency aligned
with corporate management against the corporation's shareholders.
Paradoxically the SEC, in attempting to bridge the gap between
corporate ownership and control, has actually contributed to the
widening of that gap. The ownership interest of the typical modern
shareholder in a large corporation is radically different from that which
an individual in Locke's era had in his or her property. A large corpo-
ration's stock is widely held among the public, and the average share-
holder expects little more than financial return in the investment made
in the corporation.2 82 As such, this interest appears substantially simi-
lar to that of a debenture holder.28 3 Moreover, because a vast majority
of shareholders acquire their shares for investment, as opposed to tradi-
tional ownership purposes of exercising control and dominion over
property,28 4 a high turnover of shares is likely. As a consequence, the
boundary between a shareholder and a member of the investing public
tends to fade, as passage from one to the other is likely to be frequent
and often almost imperceptible.
28 5
The blurring of shareholders' interests with those of debenture
holders and members of the investing public accounts for substantial
erosion of the attorney-client privilege in the context of the SEC's
mandatory disclosure scheme. On the one hand, because the passage
from shareholder to debenture holder to member of the investing pub-
lic is nearly imperceptible, the positive duty to disclose material infor-
mation to shareholders becomes, for practical purposes, a duty to
disclose to the world at large. On the other hand, because the interests
of shareholders are often nearly indistinguishable from those of the in-
vesting public and those of management are closely identified with the
fortunes of the corporate enterprise, realignments of relations, as in
LTV, might be substantially justified.286 Ultimately, the combination
282. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 104, at xix.
283. Cf. Broad v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 1 95,894 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 18, 1977) (for purposes of attorney-client privilege, corpora-
tion owes debenture holders fiduciary duty similar to duty owed to shareholders).
284. See BERLE & MEANS, supra note 104, at viii.
285. Compare SEC v.Gulf& Western Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 686 (D.D.C. 1981) (SEC
showing of good cause as protector of public interest may defeat privilege) with Garner v.
Wolfinbarger, 430 F.2d 1093, 1103-04 (5th Cir. 1970) (shareholder showing of good cause
defeats corporation's privilege).
286. Whereas the dispersed owners may, at the individual level, have but a small eco-
nomic interest in the fortunes of the corporation, the corporate executive's whole economic
well being is likely to be bound up with the corporation. Sommer, ProfessionalResponsibil-
ity,: How Did We Get Here?, 30 Bus. LAW. S-95, S-96 (1975).
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of an extended positive duty to disclose with a justification for flexible
and relatively frequent realignments of relations deprives the attorney-
client privilege of both clear definition and ideological justification.
Conclusion
In the context of federal securities law, the attorney-client privilege
has survived more in name than in substance. Although it has not been
eliminated, the privilege has nevertheless lost two essential attributes:
the power to grant absolute protection and a clear definition of the
realm of its application.
The privilege was originally structured to protect communications
between an attorney and the individual client. The privilege has failed
to remain intact during its passage through the extension and evolution
of individualism because of its lack of flexibility to accomodate the
fragmentation of interests within the corporate client and the interposi-
tion of occasionally overriding alien interests alongside those of attor-
ney and client.
The fragmentation of property coupled with the regulatory process
designed to reinstate its unity has contributed to the privilege's progres-
sive erosion. With property at its Lockean apogee, the individual, the
attorney, and the adversary system converge in mutual support of the
attorney-client privilege, in a unified vision of individualism justified
by the theory of rights. The fragmentation of property in the corporate
world, and the efforts of the SEC to restore unity through regulation,
however, have brought the basic rights of the individual in direct con-
flict with the requirements of the adversary system, as the attorney-
client privilege retreats before the positive duty to disclose.
The SEC disclosure system relies primarily on theory of rights
principles to reinstate the unity of property. Paradoxically, this reli-
ance leads not only to the erosion of the attorney-client privilege, but
also to the removal of the theory of rights as a justification for the privi-
lege. Shareholders' positive rights to information often conflict with
corporate management's rights as a participant in the adversary system.
As the theory of rights does not resolve conflicts among different rights,
any attempted justification of the privilege based on this theory is
bound to fail. 2
8 7
Utilitarianism supplies no better justification for the attorney-c-
287. The inability of the theory of rights to resolve conflicts among rights arises out of
the fact that a right cannot be made dependent on any weighing of the consequences of its
exercise. See Rosenfeld, supra note 16, at 480.
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ent privilege than does the theory of rights. Utilitarianism appears
suited to the task of establishing orders of priority among conflicting
rights through a careful weighing of their consequences. Establishing
such an order of priority between a shareholder's right of ownership, as
it is defined by the SEC's regulatory scheme, and the right of a corpo-
rate protagonist in the adversary system to consult counsel freely, how-
ever, might be impossible without exceeding the bounds of
individualism. A strong argument can be made that both the right of
the shareholder and the right of the corporate protagonist are funda-
mental to the particular realm in which they are operative: as the
abridgement of either would pose a substantial threat to the integrity of
individualism, the conflicts between them cannot be avoided.28 To the
extent, therefore, that one of these rights can be possessed only in the
absence of the other, the conflict is essentially unresolvable.
Despite the steady erosion of the attorney-client privilege, it re-
mains an essential element of our legal system. The justification for the
privilege varies with each of three phases of individualism: atomistic
individualism, extended individualism that encompasses the split cor-
porate atom, and individualism that substantially relies on the grant of
positive rights. If each of these phases surrendered completely to the
next, one could persuasively advocate the complete elimination of the
privilege at the onset of the last of these phases. Nevertheless, each of
these phases continues to coexist with the others, although the advent
of a new phase curtails the applicability of the institutions created to
meet the needs of a previously existing phase. Thus, individual persons
appear to have the same need for attorneys and the protections of the
attorney-client privilege in the era of securities regulation as they did in
the past. Moreover, a corporation subject to the securities laws can
sometimes operate substantially like an atomistic individual, such as in
an adversary proceeding against another corporation. Each phase can
coexist with the others, and a single entity, the corporation, which ap-
pears to be subject to the institutions developed by a later phase, can
nevertheless be in a situation in which the institutions of a previous
phase apply exclusively.
Communications between a corporate client and its attorney de-
serve some protection, although not the absolute protection that the at-
torney-client privilege provides to the individual. In those situations in
which no protection is warranted, such as some shareholder suits for
securities fraud, the protection afforded the corporate client would have
288. See notes 113, 215 supra.
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to be in the form of a qualified privilege. 289 Moreover, because the
justification for protection may depend on the particular facts involved
and on the phase of individualism that encompasses it, such qualified
privilege would have to be flexible and adaptable enough to afford the
proper measure of protection.
As illustrated by the need for a hybrid privilege in the LTV case,
the protections afforded by the qualified privilege should not be limited
to those which the attorney-client privilege was formerly empowered to
bestow. Moreover, because a qualified privilege never assures absolute
certainty that any particular attorney-client communication will for-
ever remain secret, case-by-case judicial analysis might best define the
privilege's parameters. This method, more than any other, is suited to
absorbing new developments and trends.
The progressive definition of a qualified privilege is preferable to
continued adherence to an eroded and ill-defined attorney-client privi-
lege. Instead of perpetuating a concept that no longer corresponds to
its underlying content, the courts should attempt to define a conceptual
framework that more adequately evokes the reality that the concept
represents.
289. The corporate attorney-client privilege may already be a qualified privilege when-
ever the corporation is confronted by an administrative agency acting as the protector of the
public interest. See SEC v. Gulf & Western Indus., 518 F. Supp. 675, 686 (D.D.C. 1981).
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